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ABSTRACT 
 
Bounds on Average and Quantile Treatment Effects of 
Job Corps Training on Wages
* 
 
We assess the effectiveness of Job Corps (JC), the largest job training program targeting 
disadvantaged youth in the United States, by constructing nonparametric bounds for the 
average and quantile treatment effects of the program on wages. Our preferred estimates 
point toward convincing evidence of positive effects of JC on wages both at the mean and 
throughout the wage distribution. For the different demographic groups analyzed, the 
statistically significant estimated average effects are bounded between 4.6 and 12 percent, 
while the quantile treatment effects are bounded between 2.7 and 11.7 percent. Furthermore, 
we find that the program’s effect on wages varies across quantiles and groups. Blacks likely 
experience larger impacts in the lower part of their wage distribution, while Whites likely 
experience larger impacts in the upper part of their distribution. Non-Hispanic Females show 
statistically significant impacts in the upper part of their distribution but not in the lower part. 
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Assessment of the eect of government labor market programs on participants' out-
comes (e.g., earnings, education, employment) is of great importance to policy makers.
To compare these programs' eectiveness to their public cost, one relies on the ability
to estimate the causal eects of the program, which is usually a dicult task. The vast
majority of both empirical and methodological econometric literature on program evalu-
ation (e.g., Heckman, LaLonde and Smith, 1999; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009) focuses
on estimating causal eects of participation on total earnings, which is a basic step for
a cost-benet analysis. Evaluating the impact on total earnings, however, leaves open
a relevant question about whether or not these programs have a positive eect on the
wages of participants through the accumulation of human capital, which is an important
goal of active labor market programs.
Total earnings are the product of the individual's wage times hours worked. In other
words, earnings have two components: price of labor and quantity supplied of labor.
By focusing on estimating the impact of program participation on earnings one cannot
distinguish how much of the eect is due to human capital improvements. Assessing the
labor market eect of program participation on human capital requires focusing on the
price component of earnings, i.e., wages. The reason is that wages are directly related
to the improvement of participants' human capital through the program. Unfortunately,
estimation of the program's eect on wages is not straightforward due to the well-known
sample selection problem (Heckman, 1979). Essentially, wages are observed only for those
individuals who are employed. Even randomization of program participation does not
solve this problem, as the comparison of wages between treatment and control groups
does not result in causal eects because the individual's decision to become employed is
endogenous and occurs after randomization.
In this paper, we use data from the National Job Corps Study (NJCS), a randomized
evaluation of the Job Corps (JC) program, to empirically assess the eect of JC training
on wages. We analyze eects both at the mean and at dierent quantiles of the wage
distribution of participants, as well as for dierent demographic groups. To accomplish
this objective, we construct nonparametric bounds that require weaker assumptions than
those conventionally employed for point identication of average treatment eects in
3the presence of sample selection.1 We focus on estimating bounds on the population of
individuals who would be employed regardless of participation in JC, as previously done
in Lee (2009) and Zhang et al. (2008), among others. The main reason is that wages are
non-missing under both treatment arms for this group of individuals, thus requiring fewer
assumptions to construct bounds on their eect. Furthermore, this is an important group
of participants: it is estimated to be the largest group among eligible JC participants,
accounting for close to 60 percent of them.
Our analysis starts by computing the Horowitz and Manski (2000) \worst-case"
bounds, which exploit the randomization in the NJCS and use the empirical support
of the outcome. However, these bounds are too wide (i.e., uninformative) in our appli-
cation. Subsequently, we proceed to tighten the bounds through the use of monotonicity
assumptions within a principal stratication framework (Frangakis and Rubin, 2002).
We employ two types of monotonicity assumptions. The rst type states individual-level
weak monotonicity of the eect of the program on employment. This assumption was
also employed by Lee (2009) to partially identify average wage eects of JC. The second
type of weak monotonicity assumption, which was not considered by Lee (2009), is on
mean potential outcomes across strata, which are subpopulations dened by the potential
values of the employment status variable under both treatment arms. These assumptions
result in informative bounds for the parameters of interest.
We contribute to the literature in several ways. We provide a substantive empiri-
cal analysis of the eect of the JC training program on wages. With a yearly cost of
about $1.5 billion, JC is America's largest job training program. As such, this federally
funded program is under constant examination and, given legislation seeking to cut fed-
eral spending, the program's operational budget is currently under scrutiny (e.g., USA
Today, 2011). Our results provide evidence on the eectiveness of this program in in-
creasing wages. Moreover, they answer a policy-relevant question regarding the potential
1Many of the methods employed for point identication of average treatment eects under sample
selection require strong distributional assumptions that may not be satised in practice, such as bivariate
normality (Heckman, 1979). One may relax this distributional assumption by relying on exclusion
restrictions (Heckman, 1990; Imbens and Angrist, 1994), which require variables that determine selection
into the sample (employment) but do not aect the outcome (wages). It is well known, however, that
in the case of employment and wages it is dicult to nd plausible exclusion restrictions (Angrist and
Krueger, 1999; Angrist and Krueger, 2001).
4heterogeneity of the wage impacts of JC at dierent points of the wage distribution, and
across dierent demographic groups. In this way, we complement the original work by
Lee (2009) who analyzed the average eect of JC on wages, and contribute to a grow-
ing literature analyzing the eectiveness of active labor market programs across dierent
demographic groups (Heckman and Smith, 1999; Abadie, Angrist, and Imbens, 2002;
Flores-Lagunes, Gonzalez, and Neumann, 2009; Flores et al., forthcoming). Finally, we
illustrate a way to analyze treatment eects on dierent quantiles of the distribution
of an outcome in the presence of sample selection by employing the set of monotonic-
ity assumptions described above.2 In doing so, we provide one of the rst applications
in economics of recently proposed sharp bounds for quantile treatment eects by Imai
(2008).3
Our results characterize the heterogeneous impact of JC training at dierent points
of the wage distribution. The estimated bounds for a sample that excludes Hispanics
strongly suggest positive eects of JC on wages, both at the mean and throughout the
wage distribution. For the dierent demographic groups analyzed, the statistically sig-
nicant estimated average eects are bounded between 4.6 and 12 percent, while the
quantile treatment eects are bounded between 2.7 and 11.7 percent.4 Our analysis by
race and gender reveals that the positive eects for Blacks appear larger in the lower half
of their wage distribution, while for Whites the eects appear larger in the upper half
of their wage distribution. Lastly, non-Hispanic Females in the lower part of their wage
distribution do not show statistically signicant positive eects of JC on their wages,
while those in the upper part do.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briey describes the Job
Corps program and the National Job Corps Study data. Section 3 formally presents the
sample selection problem and introduces the building block for the identication strategy
we employ to bound treatment eects. Section 4 describes the principal stratication
framework and the assumptions employed to construct and tighten bounds on average
treatment eects. Section 5 discusses bounds on quantile treatment eects. Section 6
2Other recent work (to be discussed below) that employs bounds on quantile treatment eects under
dierent monotonicity assumptions are Blundell et al. (2007) and Lechner and Melly (2010).
3Other models of quantile treatment eects rely on instrumental variables (Abadie, Angrist and
Imbens (2002) and Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005)), while the partial identication strategy does not.
4The reason why Hispanics are excluded from the analysis is discussed in the next section.
5presents the results of our analysis of the Job Corps program. We conclude in section 7.
2 Job Corps and the National Job Corps Study
Job Corps (JC) is America's largest and most comprehensive education and job train-
ing program. It was established in 1964 as part of the War on Poverty under the Economic
Opportunity Act, is federally funded, and is currently administered by the US Depart-
ment of Labor. With a yearly cost of about $1.5 billion, JC annual enrollment ascends
to 100,000 students (US Department of Labor, 2010). The program's goal is to help dis-
advantaged young people, ages 16 to 24, improve the quality of their lives by enhancing
their labor market opportunities and educational skills set. Eligible participants receive
academic, vocational, and social skills training at over 123 centers nationwide (US De-
partment of Labor, 2010), where they typically reside. Participants are selected based
on several criteria, including age, legal US residency, economically disadvantage status,
living in a disruptive environment, in need of additional education or training, and be
judged to have the capability and aspirations to participate in JC (Schochet et al., 2001).
Being the nation's largest job training program, the eectiveness of JC has been
debated at times. During the mid nineties, the US Department of Labor commissioned
Mathematica Policy Research, Inc. to design and implement a randomized evaluation,
the National Job Corps Study (NJCS), in order to determine the program's eectiveness.
The main feature of the study was its random assignment: individuals were taken from
nearly all JC's outreach and admissions agencies located in the 48 continuous states and
the District of Columbia and randomly assigned to treatment and control groups. During
the sample intake period from November 1994 to February 1996, a total of 80,883 rst
time eligible applicants were included in the study. From this total, approximately 12
percent were assigned to the treatment group (9,409) and 7 percent to the control group
(5,977). The remaining 65,497 were assigned to a program non-research group (Schochet
et al., 2001). After recording their data through a baseline interview for both treatment
and control experimental groups, a series of follow up interviews were conducted at weeks
52, 130, and 208 after randomization.
Randomization took place before participants' assignment to a JC center. As a result,
only 73 percent of the individuals randomly assigned to the treatment group actually
6enrolled in JC. Also, about 1.4 percent of the individuals assigned to the control group
enrolled in the program despite the three-year embargo imposed on them (Schochet et
al., 2001). Therefore, in the presence of this non-compliance, the comparison of outcomes
by random assignment to the treatment has the interpretation of the \intention-to-treat"
(ITT) eect, that is, the causal eect of being oered participation in JC. Focusing on
this parameter in the presence of non-compliance is common practice in the literature
(e.g., Lee, 2009; Flores-Lagunes et al., 2009; Zhang et al., 2009). Correspondingly, our
empirical analysis focuses on estimating informative non-parametric bounds for ITT
eects, although for simplicity we describe our methods and results in the context of
treatment eects.
We start our analysis with the same sample employed by Lee (2009), who developed
an intuitive trimming procedure for bounding the average treatment eect of JC on
participants' wages. This sample is restricted to individuals who have non-missing values
for weekly earnings and weekly hours for every week after random assignment, resulting
in a sample size of 9,145.5 We use this sample to compare our results to Lee (2009)
and to analyze the informational content of our additional assumption to tighten the
estimated bounds. Subsequently, we restrict the sample by excluding Hispanics, which
renders a sample size of 7,573. The reason to drop Hispanics is that, in contrast to all
other demographic groups in the NJCS sample, it has been documented that this group
exhibited negative (albeit not statistically signicant) impacts of JC on both employment
and earnings (e.g., Schochet et al., 2001; Flores-Lagunes et al., 2009). Since one of our
main assumptions is individual-level monotonicity of the eect of JC on employment (to
be discussed in section 4), we prefer to leave this group out of the remaining analysis
because inclusion of this group would likely violate this assumption.6 Finally, due to
both programmatic and design reasons in the NJCS, dierent subgroups in the study
population had dierent probabilities of being included in the research sample. Thus,
5As a consequence, we implicitly assume|as do the studies cited in the previous paragraph|that
the missing values are \missing completely at random". For a recent study employing a (parametric)
likelihood-based analysis to account for non-compliance, missing observations, and sample selection, see
Frumento et al. (2010).
6Nevertheless, we obtained a full set of results for the sample of Hispanics. Accordingly, most of the
estimated bounds were uninformative, and in some instances they could not be computed due to a strong
failure of the individual-level monotonicity assumption.
7throughout our analysis, we employ the NJCS design weights (Schochet, 2001).7
Summary statistics for the sample of 9,145 individuals, which essentially replicate
those of Lee (2009, p. 1075), are presented in the Internet Appendix. Pretreatment vari-
ables in the data include: demographic variables, education and background variables, in-
come variables, and employment information. As expected, given the randomization, the
distribution of these pretreatment characteristics is similar across treatment and control
groups, with the dierence in the means of both groups being not statistically signicant
at a 5 percent level. The resulting dierence for post-treatment earnings in week 208 after
random assignment across groups in this sample is quantitatively equivalent and consis-
tent with the previously found 12 percent positive eect of JC on participants' weekly
earnings (Burghardt et al., 1999; Schochet et al., 2001). Results on the eect of JC on
participants' weekly hours worked in this sample of about two hours a week are also con-
sistent with those obtained in previous studies (Schochet et al., 2001). Similar summary
statistics for the groups to be analyzed (Non-Hispanics, Blacks, Whites, Non-Hispanic
Males, and Non-Hispanic Females) are also relegated to the Internet Appendix.
3 The Sample Selection Problem and the Horowitz
and Manski Bounds
Assessing the impact of job training programs on wages is fundamentally distinct than
assessing the program's impact on earnings. Earnings are the product of the individual's
wage times hours worked, therefore, the impact on earnings encompasses the eect on
the likelihood of being employed (labor supply eect) and the eect on wages. Thus, the
impact on wages can be interpreted as a pure price eect since signicant increases in
wages can be directly related to the improvement of the participants' human capital due to
the program, which is essential for individuals to boost their labor market opportunities.
Indeed, one of JC's main goals is the enhancement of participants' human capital through
academic and vocational training. Thus, it is of considerable importance to evaluate the
program's impact on wages.
7For example, outreach and admissions agencies had struggle recruiting females for residential slots
in the past. Therefore, sampling rates to the control group were intentionally set lower for females in
some areas to overcome potential diculties with unlled slots.
8Estimation of a program's causal eect on wages is complicated|even in the presence
of random assignment|by the fact that only the wages of those employed are observed.
This is referred to in the literature as the sample selection problem (Heckman, 1979).
Formally, consider having access to data on N individuals and dene a binary treatment
Ti, which indicates whether individual i has participated in the program (Ti=1) or not
(Ti=0). We start with an assumption that accords with our data:
Assumption A. Ti is randomly assigned.
To illustrate the sample selection problem, assume for the moment that the individ-
ual's wage is a linear function of a constant term, the treatment indicator Ti and a set of
pretreatment characteristics X1i,8
(1) Y

i = 0 + Ti1 + X1i2 + U1i;
where Y 
i is the latent wage for individual i, which is observed conditional on the self-
selection process into employment. This process is also assumed (for the moment) to
be linearly related to a constant, the treatment indicator Ti and a set of pretreatment
characteristics X2i,
(2) S

i = 0 + Ti1 + X2i2 + U2i:
Similarly, S
i is a latent variable representing the individual's propensity to be employed.
Let Si denote the observed employment indicator that takes values Si=1 if individual i
is employed and 0 otherwise. Then,
Si = 1[S

i  0];
where 1[] is an indicator function. Therefore, we observe individual i's wage, Yi, when i
is employed (Si =1) and it remains latent when unemployed (Si =0).
Conventionally, point identication of the parameter of interest, 1 (assumed to be
constant over the population in this setting), requires strong assumptions such as joint
independence of the errors (U1i, U2i) in the wage and employment equations (1) and
(2) and the regressors Ti, X1i and X2i, plus bivariate normality of (U1i, U2i) (Heckman,
1979). The bivariate normality assumption about the errors can be relaxed by relying on
8Linearity is assumed here to simplify the exposition of the sample selection problem. The non-
parametric approach to address sample selection employed in this paper does not impose linearity or
functional form assumptions to partially identify the treatment eects of interest.
9exclusion restrictions (Heckman, 1990; Heckman and Smith, 1995; Imbens and Angrist,
1994), which require variables that determine employment but do not aect wages, or
equivalently, variables in X2i that do not belong in X1i. However, it is well known that
nding such variables that go along with economic reasoning in this situation is extremely
dicult (Angrist and Krueger, 1999; Angrist and Krueger, 2001).
An alternative approach suggests that the parameters can be bounded without relying
on distributional assumptions or on the availability and validity of exclusion restrictions.
Horowitz and Manski (2000; HM hereafter) proposed a general framework to construct
bounds on treatment eects when data is missing due to a nonrandom process, such as
self-selection into non-employment (S
i < 0), provided that the outcome variable has a
bounded support.9 These bounds are known in the literature as \worst-case" bounds.
To illustrate HM's bounds, let Yi(0) and Yi(1) be the potential (counterfactual) wages
for unit i under control (Ti=0) and treatment (Ti=1), respectively. The relationship
between these potential wages and the observed Yi is that Yi = Yi(1)Ti + Yi(0)(1   Ti).
Dene the average treatment eect (ATE) as
(3) ATE = E[Yi(1)   Yi(0)] = E[Yi(1)]   E[Yi(0)]:
Conditional on Ti and the observed employment indicator Si, the ATE in (3) can be
written as:
ATE = E[YijTi = 1;Si = 1]Pr(Si = 1jTi = 1)
+ E[Yi(1)jTi = 1;Si = 0]Pr(Si = 0jTi = 1)
  E[YijTi = 0;Si = 1]Pr(Si = 1jTi = 0)
  E[Yi(0)jTi = 0;Si = 0]Pr(Si = 0jTi = 0)
(4)
Examination of Equation (4) reveals that, under random assignment, we can identify
from the data all the conditional probabilities (Pr(Si = sjTi = t), for (t;s) = (0;1)) and
also the expectations of the wage when conditioning on Si=1 (E[YijTi = 1;Si = 1] and
E[YijTi = 0;Si = 1]). Unfortunately, sample selection into non-employment makes it
impossible to point identify E[Yi(1)jTi = 1;Si = 0] and E[Yi(0)jTi = 0;Si = 0]. We can,
however, construct HM bounds on these unobserved objects provided that the support
of the outcome lies in a bounded interval [Y LB;Y UB], since this implies that the values
9Horowitz and Manski (2000) derived conservative bounds on parameters of interest using nonpara-
metric analysis applied to experimental settings with problems of missing binary outcomes and covariates.
10for these unobserved objects are restricted to such interval. Thus, HM's lower and upper
bounds (LBHM and UBHM, respectively) are identied as follows:
LB
HM = E[YijTi = 1;Si = 1]Pr(Si = 1jTi = 1) + Y
LBPr(Si = 0jTi = 1)
  E[YijTi = 0;Si = 1]Pr(Si = 1jTi = 0)   Y
UBPr(Si = 0jTi = 0)
UB
HM = E[YijTi = 1;Si = 1]Pr(Si = 1jTi = 1) + Y
UBPr(Si = 0jTi = 1)
  E[YijTi = 0;Si = 1]Pr(Si = 1jTi = 0)   Y
LBPr(Si = 0jTi = 0)
(5)
Note that these bounds do not employ distributional or exclusion restrictions as-
sumptions. They are nonparametric and allow for heterogeneous treatment eects, that
is, non-constant eects over the population. On the other hand, a cost of disposing of
those assumptions is that the HM bounds are often uninformative. Indeed, this is the
case in our application as will be shown below. For this reason, we take this approach as
a building block and proceed by imposing more structure through the use of assumptions
that are typically weaker than the distributional and exclusion restriction assumptions
needed for point identication.
4 Bounds on Average Treatment Eects
We follow the approach by Lee (2009) and Zhang et al. (2008) who employ mono-
tonicity assumptions that lead to a trimming procedure that tightens the HM bounds.
They implicitly or explicitly employ the principal stratication framework of Frangakis
and Rubin (2002) to motivate and derive their results. Principal stratication provides
a framework for analyzing average causal eects when controlling for a post-treatment
variable that has been aected by treatment assignment. In the context of the eect of JC
on wages, the aected post-treatment variable is employment. In this framework, indi-
viduals are classied into \principal strata" based on the potential values of employment
under each treatment arm. Comparisons of outcomes by treatment assignment within
strata can be interpreted as causal eects because which strata an individual belongs to
is not aected by treatment assignment.
More formally, let the potential values of employment be denoted by Si(0) and Si(1)
when i is assigned to control and treatment, respectively. We can partition the population
into strata based on the values of the vector fSi(0);Si(1)g. Since both Si and Ti are
11binary, there are four principal strata:
NN : fSi(0) = 0;Si(1) = 0g
EE : fSi(0) = 1;Si(1) = 1g
EN : fSi(0) = 1;Si(1) = 0g
NE : fSi(0) = 0;Si(1) = 1g:
(6)
In the context of JC, NN is the stratum of those individuals who would be unemployed
regardless of treatment assignment, while EE is the stratum of those who would be
employed regardless of treatment assignment. The stratum EN represents those who
would be employed if assigned to control but unemployed if assigned to treatment, and
NE is the stratum of those who would be unemployed if assigned to control but employed
if assigned to treatment. Given that strata are dened based on the potential values of Si,
the stratum an individual belongs to is unobserved. A mapping of the observed groups
based on (Ti;Si) to the unobserved strata above is depicted in the rst two columns of
Table 1.
Lee (2009) and Zhang et al. (2008) focus on the average treatment eect of a program
on wages for individuals who would be employed regardless of treatment status, i.e., the
EE stratum. This stratum is the only one for which wages are observed under both
treatment arms, and thus fewer assumptions are required to construct bounds for its
eects. We focus on the eects on this same stratum. Thus, the average treatment eect
parameter we concentrate on is:
(7) ATEEE = E[Yi(1)jEE]   E[Yi(0)jEE]:
4.1 Bounds Adding an Individual-Level Monotonicity Assump-
tion
To tighten the HM bounds presented in Section 3, we can employ the following
individual-level monotonicity assumption about the relationship between the treatment
(JC) and employment:
Assumption B. Individual-Level Positive Weak Monotonicity of T on S(T): Si(1) 
Si(0) for all i.
This assumption states that treatment assignment aects employment (weakly) in one
direction, eectively ruling out the EN stratum. Both Lee (2009) and Zhang et al. (2008)
12employed this assumption. In the context of JC, Assumption B is plausible because one
of the program's stated goals is to increase the employability of participants. It does
so by providing academic, vocational and social skills training to participants, as well
as job search assistance. Indeed, the NJCS reported a positive and highly statistically
signicant average eect of JC on employment (Schochet et al. 2001).
Nevertheless, this assumption can be criticized since it assumes the sign of the indi-
vidual treatment eect of the program on employment (e.g., Lechner and Melly, 2010).10
Two factors that may cast doubt on this assumption in our setting are that individuals
are \locked-in" away from employment while undergoing training (van Ours, 2004), and
the possibility that trained individuals may have a higher reservation wage after training
and thus may choose to remain unemployed (e.g., Blundell et al., 2007). Note, however,
that these two factors become less relevant the longer the time horizon after randomiza-
tion at which the outcome is measured. For this reason, we focus on wages at the 208th
week after random assignment, which is the latest wage measure available in the NJCS.11
In addition, there is one demographic group in our sample for which Assumption B is
likely not appropriate. Hispanics in the NJCS were the only group found to have negative
but statistically insignicant eects of JC on both earnings and employment (Schochet et
al., 2001; Flores-Lagunes et al., 2009). Thus, in the main analysis to be presented below,
we consider a sample that excludes this group. Lastly, Assumption B can be falsied by
the data, as it gives rise to the following testable implication (Zhang et al., 2008; Imai,
2008): Pr(S = 0jT = 0)  Pr(S = 0jT = 1)  0. We employ this testable implication in
our empirical analysis below.
Assumption B, by virtue of eliminating the EN stratum, allows the identication
of some individuals in the EE and NN strata, as can be seen after deleting the EN
stratum in the last column of Table 1. Furthermore, the combination of Assumptions A
and B point identies the proportions of each principal strata in the population. Let k
be the population proportions of each principal strata k = NN;EE;EN;NE, and let
pSjT  Pr(Si = sjTi = t) for t;s = 0;1. Then, EE = p1j0;NN = p0j1;NE = p1j1 p1j0 =
10Lechner and Melly (2010) relax this individual-level monotonicity by making it hold conditional on
observed covariates.
11Zhang et al. (2009) provide some evidence that the estimated proportion of individuals who do
not satisfy the individual-level assumption (the EN stratum) falls with the time horizon at which the
outcome is measured after randomization.
13p0j0 p0j1 and EN = 0. Looking at the last column of Table 1, we know that individuals in
the observed group with (Ti;Si) = (0;1) belong to the stratum of interest EE. Therefore,
we can point identify E[Yi(0)jEE] in (7) with E[YijTi = 0;Si = 1]. However, it is not
possible to point identify E[Yi(1)jEE], since the observed group with (Ti;Si) = (1;1) is
a mixture of individuals from two strata, EE and NE. Nevertheless, it can be bounded.
We can write E[YijTi = 1;Si = 1] as a weighted average of individuals belonging to the
EE and NE strata:
(8) E[YijTi = 1;Si = 1] =
EE
(EE + NE)
E[Yi(1)jEE] +
NE
(EE + NE)
E[Yi(1)jNE]
Since the proportion of EE individuals in the group (Ti;Si) = (1;1) can be point
identied as EE=(EE +NE)=p1j0=p1j1, E[Yi(1)jEE] can be bounded from above by the
expected value of Yi for the (p1j0=p1j1) fraction of the largest values of Yi in the observed
group (Ti;Si)=(1, 1). In other words, the upper bound is obtained under the scenario
that the largest (p1j0=p1j1) values of Yi belong to the EE individuals. Thus, computing the
expected value of Yi after trimming the lower tail of the distribution of Yi in (Ti;Si)=(1,
1) by 1   (p1j0=p1j1) yields an upper bound for the EE group. Similarly, E[Yi(1)jEE]
can be bounded from below by the expected value of Yi for the (p1j0=p1j1) fraction of the
smallest values of Yi for those in the same observed group. The resulting upper (UBEE)
and lower (LBEE) bounds for ATEEE are (Lee, 2009; Zhang et al., 2008):
UBEE = E[YijTi = 1;Si = 1;Yi  y
11
1 (p1j0=p1j1)]   E[YijTi = 0;Si = 1]
LBEE = E[YijTi = 1;Si = 1;Yi  y
11
(p1j0=p1j1)]   E[YijTi = 0;Si = 1];
(9)
where y11
1 (p1j0=p1j1) and y11
(p1j0=p1j1) denote the 1   (p1j0=p1j1) and the (p1j0=p1j1) quantiles of
Yi conditional on Ti = 1 and Si = 1, respectively. Lee (2009) shows that these bounds
are sharp (i.e., there are no shorter bounds possible under the current assumptions).
To estimate the bounds in (9) we can simply substitute sample quantities for popu-
lation quantities:
\ UBEE =
n
i=1Yi  Ti  Si  1[Yi  d y1 ^ p]
n
i=1Ti  Si  1[Yi  d y1 ^ p]
 
n
i=1Yi  (1   Ti)  Si
n
i=1(1   Ti)  Si
\ LBEE =
n
i=1Yi  Ti  Si  1[Yi  b y^ p]
n
i=1Ti  Si  1[Yi  b y^ p]
 
n
i=1Yi  (1   Ti)  Si
n
i=1(1   Ti)  Si
;
(10)
where d y1 ^ p and b y^ p are the sample analogs of the quantities y11
1 (p1j0=p1j1) and y11
(p1j0=p1j1) in
(9), respectively, and ^ p, the sample analog of (p1j0=p1j1), is calculated as follows:
(11) ^ p =
n
i=1(1   Ti)  Si
n
i=1(1   Ti)
=
n
i=1Ti  Si
n
i=1Ti
14Lee (2009) shows that these estimators are asymptotically normal and employs them
to estimate the average eect of JC on wages at dierent time horizons after random-
ization. Below, we will replicate his results for wages at week 208 after randomization.
We will also obtain corresponding estimates for relevant groups and estimate alterna-
tive tighter bounds that impose more structure that we argue is plausible in the current
setting.
4.2 Adding Weak Monotonicity of Mean Potential Outcomes
Across Strata to Tighten the Bounds
We present a weak monotonicity assumption of mean potential outcomes across the
EE and NE strata level that tightens the bounds in (9). This assumption was originally
proposed by Zhang and Rubin (2003) and employed in Zhang et al. (2008):
Assumption C. Weak Monotonicity of Mean Potential Outcomes Across the EE and
NE Strata: E[Y (1)jEE]  E[Y (1)jNE].
Intuitively, this assumption formalizes the notion that the EE stratum is likely to be
comprised of more \able" individuals than those belonging to the NE stratum. Since
\ability" is positively correlated with labor market outcomes (e.g., wages and employ-
ment), one would expect wages for the individuals who are employed regardless of treat-
ment status (the EE stratum) to weakly dominate on average the wages of those individ-
uals who are employed only if they receive training (the NE stratum). While Assumption
C is not directly testable, one can indirectly gauge its plausibility by comparing the aver-
age of pre-treatment variables that are highly correlated with wages between the EE and
NE strata.12 We illustrate this in our analysis below. Assumption C is related to|but
dierent from|Manski and Pepper's (2000) \monotone instrumental variable" assump-
tion. Their assumption states that mean responses vary weakly monotonically across
subpopulations dened by specic values of the instrument. In contrast, Assumption C
compares mean responses across two principal strata.
Employing Assumptions A, B, and C results in tighter bounds. To see this, recall
12In a setting where the outcome is not truncated due to non-employment, Flores and Flores-Lagunes
(2010) show that Assumption C provides testable implications that can be employed to falsify it. Un-
fortunately, in our current setting, the unobservability of wages for those unemployed prevents the
computation of these testable implications.
15that the average outcome in the observed group with (Ti;Si) = (1;1) contains units from
two strata, EE and NE, and can be written as the weighted average shown in (8). By
replacing E[Yi(1)jNE] with E[Yi(1)jEE] in 8 and using the inequality in Assumption C,
we have that E[YijTi = 1;Si = 1]  E[Yi(1)jEE], and thus that E[Yi(1)jEE] is bounded
from below by E[YijTi = 1;Si = 1]. Therefore, the lower bound for ATEEE becomes:
E[YijTi = 1;Si = 1]   E[YijTi = 0;Si = 1]. Imai (2008) shows that these bounds are
sharp.
To estimate the bounds under Assumptions A, B, and C, note that the upper bound
estimate of (9) remains \ UBEE from (10), while the estimate for the lower bound is the
corresponding sample analog of E[YijTi = 1;Si = 1]   E[YijTi = 0;Si = 1]:
(12) \ LBc
EE =
n
i=1Yi  Ti  Si
n
i=1Ti  Si
 
n
i=1Yi  (1   Ti)  Si
n
i=1(1   Ti)  Si
:
5 Bounds on Quantile Treatment Eects
We now extend the results presented in the previous section to the construction of
bounds on quantile treatment eects (QTE) based on results by Imai (2008). The param-
eters of interest are dened as the dierence in the quantiles of the distributions of the
potential outcomes Y (1) and Y (0). This dierence is well-dened as long as the marginal
distributions of potential outcomes are point or partially identied. Our parameter of
interest is the -quantile eect for the EE stratum:
(13) QTE

EE = F
 1
Yi(1)jEE()   F
 1
Yi(0)jEE();
where F
 1
Yi(t)jEE() denotes the  quantile of the distribution of Yi(t) for the EE stratum.
Two recent papers have focused on partial identication of QTE. Blundell, et. al.,
(2007) derived sharp bounds on the distribution of wages and the interquantile range
to study income inequality in the U.K. Their work builds on the worst-case bounds on
the conditional quantiles in Manski (1994), which are tighten by imposing stochastic
dominance assumptions. Their stochastic dominance assumption is applied to the distri-
bution of wages of individuals observed employed and unemployed, whereby the wages of
employed individuals are assumed to weakly dominate those of unemployed individuals
(i.e., positive selection into employment). In addition, they explore the use of exclusion
restrictions to further tighten their bounds. Lechner and Melly (2010) analyze QTE of
16a German training program on wages. They impose an individual-level monotonicity
assumption similar to our Assumption B that is weakened by conditioning on covariates
X, and they subsequently employ the stochastic dominance assumption of Blundell et
al. (2007) to tighten their bounds. In contrast to those papers, we take advantage of
the randomization in the NJCS to estimate QTE by employing individual-level mono-
tonicity (Assumption B) and by strengthening Assumption C to stochastic dominance
applied to the EE and NE strata. Another dierence between those studies and ours is
the parameters of interest. While Blundell et al. (2007) focus on the population QTE,
Lechner and Melly (2010) focus on the QTE for those individuals who are employed
under treatment. Our focus is on the QTE for individuals who are employed regardless
of treatment assignment (the EE stratum).13
Let FYijTi=t;Si=s() be the cumulative distribution of individuals' wages conditional on
Ti = t and Si = s, and let yts
 denote its corresponding -quantile, for  2 (0;1), or yts
 =
F
 1
YijTi=t;Si=s (). Following the same intuition for partial identication of E[Yi(1)jEE] by
trimming the observed quantity E[YijTi = 1;Si = 1], we can partially identify QTE
EE as
follows:
Proposition 1 (Imai, 2008). Under assumptions A and B, LB
EE  QTE
EE  UB
EE,
where
UB

EE = F
 1
YijTi=1;Si=1;Yiy11
1 (p1j0=p1j1)
()
  F
 1
YijTi=0;Si=1()
LB

EE = F
 1
YijTi=1;Si=1;Yiy11
(p1j0=p1j1)
()
  F
 1
YijTi=0;Si=1()
(14)
Similar to (9), FYijTi=1;Si=1;Yiy11
1 (p1j0=p1j1)() and FYijTi=1;Si=1;Yiy11
(p1j0=p1j1)() correspond
to the upper and lower bounding distributions of the wages of those individuals who
belong to EE in the observed group (Ti;Si) = (1;1). As such, UB
EE is an upper bound
for the dierence in quantiles between the treated and control groups' outcomes at a
given -quantile for the EE stratum. Similarly, LB
EE represents a lower bound for this
dierence. Imai (2008) shows that the bounds in (14) are sharp.
13The treated-and-employed subpopulation is a mixture of two strata: EE and NE. In our application,
the EE stratum and the treated-and-employed subpopulation account for about the same proportion of
the population (57 and 61 percent, respectively).
17We estimate the bounds in (14) as:
\ UB
EE = b yu
   b yc

\ LB
EE = b yl
   b yc
;
(15)
where the -quantile for each marginal distribution is calculated as:
b yh
 = minfy :
n
i=1Ti  Si  1[Y h
i  y]
n
i=1Ti  Si
 g;
with h = fu;lg for the upper and lower bounding distribution, respectively, and Y h
i rep-
resenting the outcome of individuals in the group with [Ti = 1;Si = 1;Yi  y11
1 (p1j0=p1j1)]
for h = u or [Ti = 1;Si = 1;Yi  y11
(p1j0=p1j1)] for h = l. Similarly, the -quantile for the
observed control group with (Ti;Si) = (0;1) is calculated as:
b yc
 = minfy :
n
i=1(1   Ti)  Si  1[Y c
i  y]
n
i=1(1   Ti)  Si
 g;
with Y c
i representing the outcome of the individuals in the group with (Ti;Si) = (0;1).
5.1 Tightening Bounds on QTE using Stochastic Dominance
We tighten the bounds in (14) by employing an assumption similar to Assumption C
in section 4.2. For the case of QTE, this assumption has to be strengthened to stochastic
dominance:
Assumption D. Stochastic Dominance Between the EE and NE Strata.: FYi(1)jEE(y) 
FYi(1)jNE(y),
where FYijEE() and FYijNE() are the cumulative distributions of wages for individuals
who belong to the EE and NE strata, respectively.
This assumption directly imposes restrictions on the distribution of potential outcomes
under treatment for individuals in the EE stratum, which results in a tighter lower bound
relative to that in (14). After adding this assumption, the resulting sharp bounds are:
Proposition 2 (Imai, 2008). Under assumptions A, B, and D, LBd
EE  QTE
EE 
UB
EE, where UB
EE is as in (14) and
(16) LB
d
EE = F
 1
YijTi=1;Si=1()   F
 1
YijTi=0;Si=1()
The estimator of the upper bound is still given by \ UB
EE in (15), while the estimator
for LBd
EE is now given by:
(17) \ LBd
EE = b yl
   b yc
;
18where b yl
 = minfy :
n
i=1TiSi1[Y t
i y]
n
i=1TiSi  g, and Y t
i represents the outcome of those indi-
viduals in the group with (Ti;Si) = (1;1).
6 Estimation of Bounds on the Eect of Job Corps
on Wages
In this section we empirically assess the eect of JC training on wages using data from
the NJCS. In Section 6.1, we concentrate on the average treatment eect and compute
the HM bounds under random assignment (Assumption A). Subsequently, we estimate
bounds for ATEEE that add dierent assumptions in order to tighten these benchmark
bounds. Section 6.2 reports bounds derived under Assumptions A and individual-level
monotonicity (Assumption B), while Section 6.3 explores the identifying power of weak
monotonicity of mean potential outcomes across strata (Assumption C). Sections 6.4 and
6.5 present and discuss bounds on QTE
EE.
6.1 Horowitz and Manski (HM) bounds
Table 2 reports the HM bounds, which only employ random assignment (Assumption
A), for the average treatment eect of JC on log wages in week 208 after randomization.
The table shows two sets of bounds. In the rst, we follow Lee (2009) and transform
log wages to minimize the eect of outliers on the width of these bounds by splitting
the entire observed wage distribution into 20 percentile groups (5th, 10th,..., and 95th
percentile of log wages) and assigning to individuals in each percentile the mean log wage
in that group. The last column computes the HM bounds using the untransformed log
wages to exploit the original variation in this variable and to be able to use these bounds
as benchmark when adding other assumptions and when computing bounds on the QTE.
Table 2 shows that Lee's transformed log wages have an upper bound on their support,
denoted by Y UB in (5), of 2.77, and a lower bound, Y LB, of 0.90. As expected, the
\smoothing" of wages has a large impact on the support of the outcome, since the last
column shows that for the untransformed wages the upper and lower bounds on their
support are 5.99 and -1.55, respectively. Consequently, the width of the HM bounds for
the untransformed log wages (6.244) is considerably larger than that for the transformed
19ones (1.548). Detailed calculations of all quantities needed to construct the bounds in (5)
are shown in the second column of Table 2. Despite the large dierences between the two
measures of wages, the evidence in Table 2 has the same qualitative implication about the
HM bounds: they are largely uninformative. The estimated HM bounds on the average
treatment eect of JC on wages using transformed log wages are 0.802 (upper bound)
and -0.746 (lower bound), while using untransformed log wages are 3.135 (upper bound)
and -3.109 (lower bound). These bounds are the basis upon which we add assumptions
to tighten them.
6.2 Bounds Adding Individual-Level Monotonicity
Under individual-level monotonicity of JC on employment (Assumption B) we par-
tially identify the average eect of JC on wages for those individuals who are employed
regardless of treatment assignment (the EE stratum). Therefore, it is of interest to es-
timate the size of that stratum relative to the full population, which can be done under
Assumptions A and B. Table 3 reports the estimated strata proportions for the full sam-
ple (labeled \All") and for demographic groups of interest. The EE stratum accounts for
close to 57 percent of the population, making it the largest stratum. The second largest
stratum is the \never employed" or NN, accounting for 39 percent of the population.
Lastly, the NE stratum accounts for 4 percent (the stratum EN is ruled out by Assump-
tion B). The relative magnitudes of the strata largely hold for all demographic groups.
Interestingly, Whites have the highest proportion of EE individuals at 66 percent, while
Blacks have the lowest at 51 percent.
Table 4 reports estimated bounds for ATEEE for the full sample using (10) under
Assumptions A and B, for both transformed and untransformed wages. The second col-
umn exactly replicates the results by Lee (2009) using transformed log wages. Relative
to the HM bounds, these bounds are much tighter: their width goes from 1.548 in the
HM bounds to 0.112. However, the bounds still include zero, as does the Imbens and
Manski (2004; IM hereafter) condence intervals reported in the last row. These con-
dence intervals include the true parameter of interest with a 95 percent probability. The
fourth column of Table 4 reports estimated bounds for ATEEE under Assumptions A
and B using the untransformed log wages. Unlike the HM bounds, the present bounding
procedure does not depend on the empirical support of the outcome, thereby the eect
20of transforming wages is negligible. While the width of the bounds using either measure
of wages is similar, both the bounds and the IM condence intervals include zero. Thus,
from Table 4 we see that Assumption B greatly tightens the HM bounds, although not
enough to rule out zero or a small negative eect of JC on wages at week 208.
As discussed in Section 4.1, the untestable individual-level weak monotonicity assump-
tion of the eect of JC on employment may be inadequate in certain circumstances. In
the context of JC, the group of Hispanics has been found to be unusual in the sense that
the NJCS calculated negative but statistically insignicant average eects of the program
on both their employment and weekly earnings at week 208, while for the other groups
these eects were positive and highly statistically signicant (Schochet et al., 2001).14
This evidence casts doubt on the validity of Assumption B for the group of Hispanics.
Therefore, we consider a sample that excludes this group (labelled \Non-Hispanics"),
which includes 7,573 individuals.15
Panel A of Table 5 presents estimated bounds under Assumptions A and B for dierent
demographic groups, along with their width and 95 percent IM condence intervals. The
second column reproduces the bounds in Table 4 for the full sample (All). The third
column presents the corresponding estimated bounds for the Non-Hispanics sample. The
upper bound for this group is larger than the one for All, while the lower bound is less
negative, which is consistent with the discussion above regarding Hispanics. The IM
condence intervals are wider for the non-Hispanics sample relative to All, but they are
more concentrated on the positive side of the real line. In terms of the other groups
(Whites, Blacks, and Non-Hispanic Males and Females), none of the estimated bounds
exclude zero, although Whites and Non-Hispanic Males have a lower bound almost right
at zero. In general, the IM condence intervals for the last four demographic groups are
wider than those of the All and Non-Hispanics groups, which is likely a consequence of
their smaller sample sizes.
We now check the testable implication of Assumption B mentioned in Section 4.1:
Pr(S = 0jT = 0) Pr(S = 0jT = 1)  0. Note that the left-hand-side of this expression
14The NJCS reported that Hispanics participating in JC had a statistically insignicant decrease in
the probability of employment of 3.1 percentage points (Schochet et al., 2001).
15In principle, it is possible to construct bounds on the average eect on the EE stratum that dispose
of the individual-level monotonicity assumption (Zhang et al., 2008). However, these bounds are typically
too wide, which is the case in our application.
21is the proportion of individuals in the NE stratum (NE), which is reported in Table 3
for all groups except Hispanics. From the table it can be seen that all estimated NE
stratum proportions are between 0.04 and 0.06, and they are statistically signicant at
a 1 percent level (not shown in the table). For Hispanics, the corresponding proportion
is a statistically insignicant 0.0021. This evidence indicates that Assumption B is not
falsied by the data for all groups reported in Table 3, and suggests that such evidence
is dubious for Hispanics.
We close this section by arguing, as does Lee (2009), that small and negative esti-
mated lower bounds on the eect of JC on wages under the current assumptions can be
interpreted as pointing toward positive eects. The reason is that the lower bound is ob-
tained by placing individuals in the EE stratum at the bottom of the distribution of the
observed group with (Ti;Si) = (1;1). While this mathematically identies a valid lower
bound, it implies a perfect negative correlation between employment and wages that is
implausible from the standpoint of standard models of labor supply, in which individuals
with higher predicted wages are more likely to be employed. Indeed, one interpretation
that can be given to Assumption C (employed in the next section) is that of formalizing
this theoretical notion to tighten the lower bound.
6.3 Bounds Adding Weak Monotonicity of Mean Potential Out-
comes Across Strata
The columns labelled \A, B, and C" in Table 4 present the estimated bounds for the
full sample adding Assumption C, for both transformed and untransformed log wages.
This assumption has considerable identifying power as it results in much tighter bounds
for the ATEEE compared to the previously estimated bounds, with the width being cut in
about half for both measures of log wages. Importantly, employing Assumption C yields
estimated bounds that are informative about the sign of the eect of JC training on log
wages at week 208. Bounds on the transformed log wages are 0.034 to 0.093, and those on
the untransformed log wages are 0.037 to 0.099, with both sets ruling out negative eects.
When computing IM condence intervals on the bounds adding Assumption C, we see
in the last row of Table 4 that, with 95 percent condence, both measures of log wages
exclude zero, indicating statistically signicantly positive eects of JC. Thus, focusing on
the untransformed log wages, the eect of JC for EE individuals is signicantly positive
22and falls between 3.7 and 9.9 percent.
Given the strong identifying power of Assumption C, it is important to gauge its
plausibility in this application. A direct statistical test is not feasible since the assump-
tion is untestable. However, we indirectly gauge its plausibility by looking at one of its
implications. Assumption C formalizes the idea that the EE stratum possesses traits
that result in better labor market outcomes relative to individuals in the NE stratum.
Thus, we look at pre-treatment covariates that are highly correlated with log wages at
week 208 and test whether, on average, individuals in the EE stratum indeed exhibit
better characteristics at baseline relative to individuals in the NE stratum. We focus
mainly on the following pre-treatment variables: earnings, whether the individual held
a job, months employed (all three in the year prior to randomization), and education at
randomization.
To implement this idea, we compute average pre-treatment characteristics for the EE
and NE strata. Computing average characteristics for the EE stratum is straightforward
since, under Assumptions A and B, the individuals in the observed group (Ti;Si)=(0,1)
belong to and are representative of this stratum. To estimate average characteristics for
the NE stratum, note that their average can be written as a function of the averages of the
whole population and the other strata, all of which can be estimated under Assumptions
A and B. Let W be a pre-treatment characteristic of interest, then,
E[WjNE] = fE[W]   EEE[WjEE]   NNE[WjNN]g=NE:
The estimated dierences between the average pre-treatment variables employed for this
exercise for the EE and NE strata were all positive, indicating \better" pre-treatment
labor market characteristics for the EE stratum. Formal tests of statistical signicance
for these dierences, however, did not reject their equality (mainly because of the high
variance in the estimation of E[WjNE]). We conclude that this exercise does not pro-
vide evidence against Assumption C, while the estimated dierences suggest that it is a
plausible assumption.16
Panel B of Table 5 presents the estimated bounds, width, and IM condence intervals
for all groups under Assumptions A, B, and C. The second and third columns show
inference for the full population (All) and Non-Hispanics. Although the two sets of
16The tables corresponding to this exercise can be found in the Internet Appendix. Employing other
pre-treatment variables provided similar results (i.e., no evidence against Assumption C).
23bounds are of similar width, the bounds for Non-Hispanics are shifted higher to an eect
of JC on wages between 5 to 11.8 percent. In fact, the IM condence intervals show
that, despite the smaller sample size, this average eect is statistically signicant with
95 percent condence.
The estimated bounds for the other demographic groups in Table 5 (panel B) show
some interesting results. All of the bounds and IM condence intervals exclude zero, with
the smallest lower bound being that of All at 3.7 percent (all others are 4.6 percent and
higher). Remarkably, the estimated bounds for all the demographic groups that exclude
Hispanics are relatively similar, suggesting that their average eect of JC on wages for
the EE stratum is between about 5 and 12 percent. The dierences in the condence
intervals across groups is likely driven by the dierences in sample sizes. These results
imply unequivocal positive eects of JC on wages across the dierent demographic groups,
and they reinforce the previous notion of a strong identifying power of Assumption C.
6.4 Bounds on Quantile Treatment Eects Under Random As-
signment and Individual-Level Monotonicity
We proceed to analyze the eects of JC on participant's wages beyond the aver-
age impact by providing estimated bounds for quantile treatment eects (QTE) for the
EE stratum, QTE
EE. We start by estimating bounds under Assumptions A and B in
this subsection. To summarize the evidence from the computation of QTE at several
quantiles, we provide a series of gures for the dierent groups under analysis.17 We
concentrate on the log of the untransformed wages for brevity and to fully exploit the
original variation in this variable. The estimated QTE under Assumptions A and B,
along with their corresponding IM condence intervals, are shown in Figure 1.
Recall that the estimated bounds for the ATEEE under the same assumptions pre-
sented in Section 6.2 did not rule out zero for any of the groups under analysis. Looking
at the estimated bounds on the QTE for the full sample in Figure 1(a), they rule out zero
for all lower quantiles up to 0.7. Once IM condence intervals are computed, though, only
the bounds for the 0.2 quantile imply statistically signicant positive eects of JC on log
wages with 95 percent condence. Given the argument that Assumption B is likely not
satised for Hispanics, we look at the group of Non-Hispanics in Figure 1(b). Consistent
17The complete numerical results are shown in the Internet Appendix
24with the results from bounds on average eects, the estimated bounds on QTE
EE for
this group are generally shifted towards the positive space. For this group, the estimated
bounds also exclude zero for all lower quantiles up to 0.7, and the 95 percent IM con-
dence intervals rule out zero for the 0.5 quantile. The estimated bounds for these two
samples suggest that JC is more likely to have positive eects on log wages for the lower
quantiles of the wage distribution.
Looking at the results by race, Figures 1(c) and 1(d) show that, once again, the
estimated bounds for the QTE exclude zero for a number of lower quantiles up to 0.75
(with the exception of the 0.05 quantile for Whites and the 0.75 quantile for Blacks).
However, probably due to the smaller sample sizes, when looking at the 95 percent IM
condence intervals for these groups only quantiles 0.55 and 0.65 for Whites and the 0.05
quantile for Blacks are statistically signicant. It is worth noting that these two gures
suggest that Blacks may experience more positive eects of JC on wages in the lower
quantiles of the wage distribution, while Whites may experience more positive eects at
the upper quantiles. The large width of the IM condence intervals, however, prevents
us from being conclusive about this point.
Figures 1(e) and 1(f) show the corresponding estimated bounds and 95 percent IM
condence intervals for Non-Hispanic Males and Females, respectively. The bounds reect
a trend of excluding zero at the lower quantiles that is similar to that of the previous
groups, albeit less clear for Non-Hispanic Females. Interestingly, Non-Hispanic Males
show a greater number of estimated bounds excluding zero, which is probably due to a
lower degree of heterogeneity in this group relative to Non-Hispanic Females.18 Looking
at the IM condence intervals, none of them exclude zero for Non-Hispanic Females,
while they do for quantiles 0.05, 0.1, and 0.45 for Non-Hispanic Males. These results
suggest that inference for Non-Hispanic Females is more dicult due to their greater
heterogeneity and smaller sample size.
To end this subsection, we remark that, while the bounds and IM condence inter-
vals for the average treatment eect of JC on wages under Assumptions A and B were
inconclusive about its sign, the analysis of QTE reveals that positive eects of JC on
18By greater heterogeneity of Non-Hispanic Females relative to Non-Hispanic Males we mean that
the former group shows higher standard deviation in key variables such as age, marital and cohabitation
status, separated, presence of a child, number of children, and education. This is also true for the average
characteristics of the corresponding subset of individuals in the EE stratum.
25wages tend to occur for lower and middle quantiles of the distribution. This is the case
even when looking at groups with smaller sample sizes. Furthermore, the demographic
groups analyzed seem to experience dierent QTE, both across quantiles and groups.
Blacks appear to have larger positive eects at lower quantiles, while Whites appear to
have larger eects in the upper quantiles. Also, Non-Hispanic Females show more un-
informative results than Non-Hispanic Males. Next, we add Assumption D (stochastic
dominance) to tighten these bounds.19
6.5 Bounds on Quantile Treatment Eects Adding Stochastic
Dominance
Estimated bounds for QTE under Assumptions A, B, and D are summarized in Figure
2. The rst noteworthy feature of these estimated bounds is that all of them exclude zero
at all quantiles for all groups, which strongly suggests that the eect of JC on wages is
positive along the wage distribution for all groups. These bounds speak to the identifying
power of the stochastic dominance assumption (Assumption D). Also noteworthy is that
the general conclusions drawn from the estimated bounds in the previous subsection are
maintained and reinforced in several instances.
Looking at the results for the full sample and Non-Hispanics (Figures 2(a) and 2(b)),
we again see a shift toward more positive eects when Hispanics are dropped. Interest-
ingly, in both of these samples, the lower and upper bounds for the quantiles 0.55 and
0.8 coincide, resulting in a point-identied eect of JC on wages for these two quantiles.
Also, adding the stochastic dominance assumption results in 95 percent IM condence
intervals that exclude zero for most of the quantiles except for 0.05, 0.1, 0.6, 0.9, and 0.95
for the full sample and 0.1, 0.25, and 0.35 for the Non-Hispanic sample. Concentrating on
the latter sample, for which Assumption B is likely satised, and excluding the bounds
for the quantile 0.05 that dier from the rest, the bounds that exclude zero are between
(roughly) 2.7 and 11.7 percent. In addition, the IM condence intervals that exclude
zero largely overlap, suggesting that the eects of JC on wages do not dier substantially
19Just as with average eects, it is possible to construct bounds on QTE disposing of the individual
monotonicity assumption. While still too wide to rule out zero, several of the dierences across groups
and quantiles pointed out in this section hold for those bounds. These results are available from the
authors upon request.
26across quantiles. The only clear outliers are the estimated bounds on the 0.05 quantile,
which are between 10.5 and 20 percent. In summary, we take these results as clear in-
dication that JC has a signicantly positive eect on wages along the wage distribution
under the maintained assumptions.
The results by race are shown in Figures 2(c) and 2(d). Adding Assumption D re-
inforces the notion that Blacks likely exhibit larger positive impacts of JC on log wages
in the lower portion of the wage distribution, while Whites likely exhibit larger impacts
on the upper quantiles. Indeed, the 95 percent IM condence intervals for Blacks in the
lowest quantiles exclude zero but not those at the highest quantiles. The opposite is
true for Whites. However, despite this evidence being stronger than before, it appears
inconclusive when looking at the IM condence intervals, since there is a considerable
amount of overlap on the intervals for both groups within quantiles. The IM condence
intervals also show that Blacks have statistically signicant positive eects of JC on
wages throughout their wage distribution (except at quantiles 0.1, 0.25, 0.9, and 0.95),
with estimated bounds that are between roughly 3.1 and 11.5 percent (excluding the 0.05
quantile). Whites show statistically signicant positive eects only for quantiles larger
than 0.4 (except 0.8), with estimated bounds that are between roughly 6.1 to 14 percent.
Figures 2(e) and 2(f) present the results by Non-Hispanic gender groups. All the esti-
mated bounds under Assumptions A, B, and D for these groups exclude zero at all quan-
tiles, strongly suggesting positive eects of JC on wages and illustrating the identifying
power of adding the stochastic dominance assumption. When taking into consideration
the 95 percent IM condence intervals, we nd statistically signicant positive eects
of JC on log wages for more than half of the quantiles considered. Interestingly, Non-
Hispanic Females do not have any statistically signicant eects throughout the lower
half of their wage distribution up to quantile 0.4 (except at the 0.2 quantile), suggesting
that Non-Hispanic Females in the upper half of the distribution are more likely to ben-
et from higher wages due to JC training. Aside from this distinction, there does not
seem to be other substantial dierences between gender groups, as judged by the large
overlap in their IM condence intervals. Considering condence intervals that exclude
zero, Non-Hispanic Females have estimated bounds that are between roughly 4.4 to 12.1
percent, while those estimated bounds for Non-Hispanic Males are between roughly 3.6
27to 13.4 percent (excluding the 0.05 quantile).20
7 Conclusion
We empirically assess the eect of the Job Corps (JC) training program on wages
using data from the National Job Corps Study (NJCS), a randomized evaluation of the
program. JC is the United States' largest job training program targeting disadvantaged
youth and its stated goal is to enhance participants' human capital and labor market
outcomes. Thus, research shedding light on the eects of JC on wages is important
because wages can be related to human capital improvements due to the program. Fur-
thermore, assessments of the eectiveness of JC are opportune given recent discussions
in the public arena seeking to cut federal spending on training programs. Our results
provide substantial evidence that JC has positive and signicant eects on wages, not
only at the mean but also at dierent points of the wage distribution, and for dierent
demographic groups of interest.
Our empirical approach makes use of recent partial identication results for treat-
ment eects in the presence of sample selection due to Zhang et al. (2008), Imai (2008),
and Lee (2009). This bounding strategy allows us to estimate informative nonparamet-
ric bounds on the average and quantile treatment eects of JC on wages accounting
for non-random selection into employment under weaker assumptions than those con-
ventionally invoked for point identication. We exploit the random assignment in the
NJCS to construct \worst case" bounds (Horowitz and Manski, 2000), and then add an
individual-level monotonicity assumption on the eect of JC on employment to tighten
them. While these bounds cannot rule out negative average eects of JC on wages for
those employed irrespective of treatment assignment, by constructing bounds on quan-
20Recall that Assumption D (stochastic dominance) is stronger than Assumption C (weak monotonicity
of mean potential outcomes). To indirectly gauge the plausibility of Assumption D in a similar fashion
as Assumption C (see section 6.3), we proceeded to divide each corresponding sample into quintiles
based on a given pre-treatment covariate (we employ the same covariates as in section 6.3). Then, for
each quintile we compute and test the dierence in the average pre-treatment covariate between the EE
and NE strata. As it was the case with Assumption C, we do not nd evidence against the stochastic
dominance assumption for any of the samples analyzed. Details and the results of this exercise can be
found in the Internet Appendix.
28tile treatment eects we nd that for certain quantiles and demographic groups we are
able to statistically rule out zero or negative eects of JC on wages. These results are
noteworthy given that the lower bound under these assumptions is likely too pessimistic
since it implies a theoretically implausible perfect negative correlation between wages and
employment.
To further tighten the above bounds, we add a mean-level weak monotonicity or
a stochastic dominance assumption across strata (for average and quantile treatment
eects, respectively). This assumption formalizes the notion that individuals in some
strata are predicted to have better labor market outcomes than others, hence avoiding
the perfect negative correlation between wages and employment implied by the previous
assumptions. The estimated bounds for the average eect of JC on wages for the indi-
viduals employed irrespective of treatment assignment indicate signicant positive eects
for all groups analyzed. The estimated bounds for groups that exclude Hispanics are
remarkably similar, with an estimated lower bound of about 4.6 percent and an upper
bound of about 12 percent. Furthermore, we obtain interesting insights when analyzing
bounds on quantile treatment eects for individuals employed irrespective of treatment
assignment. In particular, we nd that the positive eects of JC on wages largely hold
across quantiles but that there are dierences across quantiles and demographic groups.
The eects for Blacks appear larger in the lower half of their wage distribution, while
the eects appear larger for Whites in the upper half of their wage distribution. In addi-
tion, Non-Hispanic Females show statistically signicant positive eects of JC on wages
in the upper part of their wage distribution, but not in the lower part. Our preferred
estimated bounds on quantile eects|those imposing individual-level monotonicity and
stochastic dominance|for the Non-Hispanic population suggest that the eect of JC on
wages across quantiles range from about 2.7 to 11.7 percent. We provide evidence that
both of these assumptions are not falsied by the data.
In summary, our results provide evidence of a positive and signicant eect of JC on
wages for those individuals who would be employed irrespective of treatment assignment.
This strongly suggests that the JC program has a positive and signicant eect on the
human capital of these individuals, and that this investment is rewarded in the labor
market in the form of higher wages. These results can be taken as encouraging with
regard to the eectiveness of JC, and they provide new insights about how the program
29aects dierent demographic groups it serves.
8 References
Abadie, A., Angrist, J., and Imbens, G. 2002. \Instrumental Variables Estimation of
Quantile Treatment Eects." Econometrica, 70: 91-117.
Angrist, J., and Krueger, A. 1999. \Empirical Strategies in Labor Economics." In
Orley Ashenfelter and David Card (eds) Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume IIIA,
Elsevier.
Angrist, J., and Krueger, A. 2001. \Instrumental Variables and the Search for Iden-
tication: From Supply and Demand to Natural Experiments." Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 15(4): 69-85.
Blundell, R., Gosling, A., Ichimura, I., and Meghir, C. 2007. \Changes in the Dis-
tribution of Male and Female Wages Accounting for Employment Composition Using
Bounds." Econometrica 75: 323-363.
Burghardt, J., McConnell, S., Meckstroth, A., Schochet, P., and Homrighausen, J.
1999. \National Job Corps Study: Report on Study Implementation." Mathematica
Policy Research, Inc., Princeton, NJ.
Chernozhukov, V. and Hansen, C. 2005. \Notes and Comments an IV Model of
Quantile Treatment Eects." Econometrica, 73(1): 245-261.
Flores, C., and Flores-Lagunes, A. 2010. \Nonparametric Partial Identication of
Causal Net and Mechanism Average Treatment Eects.", Mimeo, University of Miami.
Flores, C., Flores-Lagunes, A., Gonzales, A., and Neumann, T. Forthcoming. \Es-
timating the Eects of Length of Exposure to Instruction in a Training Program: The
Case of Job Corps." The Review of Economics and Statistics.
Flores-Lagunes, A., Gonzalez, A., and Neumann, T. 2009. \Learning but not Earning?
The Impact of Job Corps Training on Hispanic Youth." Economic Inquiry, 48: 651-67.
Frangakis, C., and Rubin, D. 2002. \Principal Stratication in Causal Inference."
Biometrics, 58: 21-29.
Frumento, P., Mealli, F., Pacini, B. and Rubin, D. 2011. \Evaluating Causal Ef-
fects in the Presence of Noncompliance, Truncation by Death, and Unintended Missing
Outcomes." Mimeo, University of Pisa.
30Heckman, J. 1979. \Sample Selection Bias as a Specication Error." Econometrica,
47: 153-162.
Heckman, J. 1990. \Varieties of Selection Bias." American Economic Review, 80:
313-318.
Heckman, J., LaLonde, R., and Smith, J. 1999. \The Economics and Econometrics of
Active Labor Market Programs." In Orley Ashenfelter and David Card (eds.) Handbook
of Labor Economics, Volume IIIA, Elsevier.
Heckman, J., and Smith, J. A. 1995. \Assessing the Case for Social Experiments."
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9(2): 85-110.
Heckman, J., and Smith, J. A. 1999. \The Pre-Programme Earnings Dip and the De-
terminants of Participation in a Social Programme: Implications for Simple Programme
Evaluation Strategies." Economic Journal, 109(2): 313-348.
Horowitz, J., and Manski, C. 2000. \Nonparametric Analysis of Randomized Exper-
iments with Missing Covariate and Outcome Data." Journal of the American Statistical
Association, 95: 77-84.
Imai, K. 2008. \Sharp Bounds on the Causal Eects in Randomized Experiments
with \Truncation-by-Death"." Statistics and Probability Letters, 78: 144-149.
Imbens, G., and Angrist, J. 1994. \Identication and Estimation of Local Average
Treatment Eects." Econometrica, 62: 467-476.
Imbens, G., and Manski, C. 2004. \Condence Intervals for Partially Identied Pa-
rameters." Econometrica, 72: 1845-1857.
Imbens, G., and Wooldridge, J. 2009. \Recent Developments in the Econometrics of
Program Evaluation." Journal of Economic Literature, 47: 5-86.
Lechner, M., and Melly, B. 2010. \Partial Identication of Wage Eects of Training
Programs." Mimeo, University of St. Gallen.
Lee, David S. 2009. \Training Wages, and Sample Selection: Estimating Sharp
Bounds on Treatment Eects." Review of Economic Studies, 76: 1071-1102.
Manski, C. 1994. \The Selection Problem." in C. Sims (ed) Advances in Econometrics,
Sixth World Congress, vol I, Cambridge, U.K. Cambridge University Press, 143-170.
Manski, C., and Pepper, J. 2000. \Monotone Instrumental Variables: With an Ap-
plication to the Returns to Schooling." Econometrica, 68: 997-1010.
Schochet, P. 2001. \National Job Corps Study: Methodological Appendixes on the
31Impact Analysis." Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., Princeton, NJ.
Schochet, P., Burghardt, J., and Glazerman, S. 2001. \National Job Corps Study:
The Impacts of Job Corps on Participants' Employment and Related Outcomes." Math-
ematica Policy Research, Inc., Princeton, NJ.
US Department of Labor. 2010. http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/training/jobcorps.html.
USA Today. 2011. \Training Sprawl Costs U.S. $18 Billion per Year", February 9,
2011.
van Ours, J. 2004. \The Locking-in Eect of Subsidized Jobs." Journal of Compara-
tive Economics, 32: 37-52.
Zhang, J., and Rubin, D. 2003. \Estimation of Causal Eects via Principal Strati-
cation When Some Outcomes are Truncated by `Death'." Journal of Educational and
Behavioral Statistics, 28: 353-368.
Zhang, J., Rubin, D., and Mealli, F. 2008. \Evaluating the Eect of Job Training Pro-
grams on Wages Through Principal Stratication." in D. Millimet et al. (eds) Advances
in Econometrics vol XXI, Elsevier.
Zhang, J., Rubin, D., and Mealli, F. 2009. \Likelihood-based Analysis of the Causal
Eects of Job Training Programs Using Principal Stratication." Journal of the American
Statistical Association, 104: 166-176.
32 
Table 1. Observed groups based on treatment and employment indicators (Ti, Si) and PS 
mix within groups. 
Groups by observed (Ti, Si)  PS  PS (individual monotonicity) 
(0,0)  NN and NE  NN and NE 
(1,1)  EE and NE  EE and NE 
(1,0)  NN and EN  NN 
(0,1)  EE and EN  EE 
Note:  PS stands for principal strata. 
 
Table 2. HM (Horowitz and Manski, 2000) Bounds on average treatment effects for week 
208 ln(wage).  
 
Quantity in eq. (5)  Transformed 
wages 
Untransformed 
wages 
Bounds on support of 
wages 
 
    5
th percentile mean wage    2.46  4.77 
95
th percentile mean wage    15.96  14.00 
Y
LB  Y
LB  0.90  -1.55 
Y
UB  Y
UB  2.77  5.99 
Control group   
    Observations    3599  3599 
(i)Employment rate   Pr(Si=1 | Ti=0)  0.566  0.566 
(ii)Mean ln(wage)  E[Yi | Ti=0, Si=1]  1.997  1.991 
(a)Upper bound  (i)*(ii)+(1-(ii))*Y
UB  2.332  3.729 
(b)Lower bound  (i)*(ii)+(1-(ii))*Y
LB  1.52  0.451 
Treatment group   
    Observations    5546  5546 
(iii)Employment rate  Pr(Si=1 | Ti=1)  0.607  0.607 
(iv)Mean ln(wage)  E[Yi | Ti=1, Si=1]  2.031  2.028 
(c)Upper bound  (iii)*(iv)+(1-(iii))*Y
UB  2.321  3.587 
(d)Lower bound  (iii)*(iv)+(1-(iii))*Y
LB  1.586  0.620 
Treatment Effect   
    Upper bound  UB
HM  0.802  3.135 
Lower bound  LB
HM  -0.746  -3.109 
Width  UB
HM -
 LB
HM  1.548  6.244 
Notes: “Transformed wages” are the wages transformed as described in Section 6.1. 
Alternatively to using Equation (5) to calculate UB
HM and
 LB
HM, one may use the upper 
and lower bounds for the control and treatment group, labeled (a), (b), (c), (d), 
respectively, and compute: UB
HM= (c)–(b) and LB
HM= (d)-(a). 
 
 
 Table 3. Estimated principal strata proportions by demographic groups under analysis. 
PS  All 
Non-
Hispanics  Whites  Blacks 
Non-
Hispanic 
Males 
Non-
Hispanic 
Females 
EE  0.566  0.559  0.657  0.512  0.583  0.530 
NN  0.393  0.392  0.303  0.436  0.377  0.410 
NE  0.041  0.049  0.040  0.052  0.040  0.060 
Observations  9145  7573  2358  4566  4280  3293 
Note: Non-Hispanics are the full sample (All) minus individuals that reported being Hispanic. 
All estimates are statistically significant 
 
 
Table 4. Bounds on the average treatment effect of the EE strata for ln(wage) in week 208. 
 
Transformed wages  Untransformed wages 
Assumptions:  A and B  A, B, and C  A and B  A, B, and C 
Control group       
    Number of observations  3599  3599  3599  3599 
(i)Proportion employed  0.566  0.566  0.566  0.566 
Mean ln(wage) for 
employed  1.997  1.997  1.991  1.991 
Treatment group 
        Number of observations  5546  5546  5546  5546 
(ii)Proportion employed  0.607  0.607  0.607  0.607 
Mean ln(wage) for 
employed  2.031  2.031  2.028  2.028 
          p= [(ii)-(i)]/(ii)  0.068  0.068  0.068  0.068 
p
th quantile  1.636  1.636  1.639  1.639 
Trimmed mean:E[Y|y>yp]  2.090  2.090  2.090  2.090 
          1-p
th quantile  2.768  2.768  2.565  2.565 
Trimmed mean:E[Y|y<y1-p]  1.978  1.978  1.969  1.969 
 
Treatment Effect 
        Upper bound  0.093  0.093  0.099  0.099 
 
(0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014) 
Lower bound  -0.019  0.034  -0.022  0.037 
 
(0.018)  (0.011)  (0.016)  (0.012) 
Width   0.112  0.059  0.121  0.062 
95 percent  
IM Confidence interval  [-0.049, 0.116]  [0.016, 0.116]  [-0.048, 0.122]  [0.018, 0.122] 
Note: Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses (based on 5,000 replications). IM refers to the 
Imbens and Manski (2004) confidence interval, which contains the true value of the 
parameter with a given probability.  
Table 5. Bounds on the average treatment effect of the EE strata for untransformed ln(wage) in week 208, by demographic 
groups. 
 
Panel A: Under Assumptions A and B 
   All  Non-Hispanics  Whites  Blacks 
Non-Hispanic 
Females 
Non-Hispanic 
Males 
Upper bound  0.099  0.118  0.120  0.116  0.120  0.114 
 
(0.014)  (0.015)  (0.028)  (0.020)  (0.024)  (0.020) 
Lower bound  -0.022  -0.018  8.989E-05  -0.012  -0.023  -0.009 
 
(0.016)  (0.017)  (0.031)  (0.021)  (0.026)  (0.023) 
Width  0.121  0.136  0.120  0.129  0.143  0.123 
95 percent IM 
confidence interval  [-0.049, 0.122]  [-0.046, 0.143]  [-0.050, 0.166]  [-0.047, 0.149]  [-0.066, 0.159]  [-0.047, 0.147] 
 
 
Panel B: Under Assumptions A, B, and C 
   All  Non- Hispanics  Whites  Blacks 
Non-Hispanic 
Females 
Non-Hispanic 
Males 
Upper bound  0.099  0.118  0.120  0.116  0.120  0.114 
 
(0.014)  (0.015)  (0.028)  (0.020)  (0.024)  (0.020) 
Lower bound  0.037  0.050  0.056  0.053  0.046  0.052 
 
(0.012)  (0.013)  (0.022)  (0.016)  (0.020)  (0.016) 
Width  0.062  0.068  0.064  0.063  0.074  0.061 
95 percent IM 
confidence interval   [0.018, 0.122]  [0.029, 0.143]  [0.019, 0.166]  [0.027, 0.149]  [0.014, 0.159]  [0.026, 0.147] 
Note: Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses (based on 5,000 replications). IM refers to the Imbens and Manski (2004) confidence 
interval, which contains the true value of the parameter with a given probability. 
 
  
 
 
Figure 1. Bounds and 95 percent Imbens and Manski (2004) confidence intervals for QTE 
by subgroups, under Assumptions A & B. Upper and lower bounds are denoted by a short 
dash, while IM confidence intervals are denoted by a long dash at the end of the dashed 
vertical lines. 
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Figure 2. Bounds and 95 percent Imbens and Manski (2004) confidence intervals for QTE 
by subgroups, under Assumptions A, B, & D. Upper and lower bounds are denoted by a 
short dash, while IM confidence intervals are denoted by a long dash at the end of the 
dashed vertical lines. 
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Table A1.1. All sample summary statistics, by treatment status, NJCS. 
Variable  Control  Program  Difference 
Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D.  Difference  S.E. 
Female  0.458  0.498  0.452  0.498  -0.006  0.010 
Age  18.351  2.101  18.436  2.159  0.085  0.045 
White  0.263  0.440  0.266  0.442  0.002  0.009 
Black  0.491  0.500  0.493  0.500  0.003  0.010 
Hispanic  0.172  0.377  0.169  0.375  -0.003  0.008 
Other race  0.074  0.262  0.072  0.258  -0.002  0.005 
Never married  0.916  0.278  0.917  0.275  0.002  0.006 
Married  0.023  0.150  0.020  0.139  -0.003  0.003 
Living together  0.040  0.197  0.039  0.193  -0.002  0.004 
Separated  0.021  0.144  0.024  0.154  0.003  0.003 
Has a child  0.193  0.395  0.189  0.392  -0.004  0.008 
# of children  0.268  0.640  0.270  0.650  0.002  0.014 
Education  10.105  1.540  10.114  1.562  0.009  0.033 
Mother's ed.  11.461  2.589  11.483  2.562  0.022  0.060 
Father's ed.  11.540  2.789  11.394  2.853  -0.146  0.075 
Ever arrested  0.249  0.432  0.249  0.432  -0.001  0.009 
Household income:             
<3,000  0.251  0.434  0.253  0.435  0.002  0.011 
3,000 - 6,000  0.208  0.406  0.206  0.405  -0.002  0.011 
6,000 - 9,000  0.114  0.317  0.117  0.321  0.003  0.008 
9,000 - 18,000  0.245  0.430  0.245  0.430  0.000  0.011 
>18,000  0.182  0.386  0.179  0.383  -0.003  0.010 
Personal income             
<3,000  0.789  0.408  0.789  0.408  -0.001  0.009 
3,000 - 6,000  0.131  0.337  0.127  0.334  -0.003  0.007 
6,000 - 9,000  0.046  0.209  0.053  0.223  0.007  0.005 
>9,000  0.034  0.181  0.031  0.174  -0.003  0.004 
At baseline             
Have a job  0.192  0.394  0.198  0.398  0.006  0.008 
Months employed  3.530  4.238  3.596  4.249  0.066  0.089 
Had a job  0.627  0.484  0.635  0.482  0.007  0.010 
Earnings  2810.482  4435.616  2906.453  6401.328  95.971  118.631 
Usual hrs/week  20.908  20.704  21.816  21.046  0.908*  0.437 
Usual weekly earnings  102.894  116.465  110.993  350.613  8.099  5.423 
After random assignment             
Week 52 weekly hrs.  17.784  23.392  15.297  22.680  -2.487*  0.482 
Week 104 weekly hrs.  21.977  26.080  22.645  26.252  0.668  0.547 
Week 156 weekly hrs.  23.881  26.151  25.879  26.574  1.997*  0.551 
Week 208 weekly hrs.  25.833  26.250  27.786  25.745  1.953*  0.544 
Week 52 weekly earnings  103.801  159.893  91.552  149.282  -12.249*  3.238 
Week 104 weekly earnings  150.407  210.241  157.423  200.266  7.015  4.297 
Week 156 weekly earnings  180.875  224.426  203.714  239.802  22.839*  4.855 
Week 208 weekly earnings  200.500  230.661  227.912  250.222  27.412*  5.127 
Sample size  3599     5546          
Notes:  Missing values for each pretreatment characteristic were imputed with the mean of that 
variable. Calculations used design weights.  
* Indicates that the difference is statistically significant at a 5% level.!
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Table A1.2. Non-Hispanics sample summary statistics, by treatment status, NJCS. 
Variable  Control  Program  Difference 
Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D.  Difference  S.E. 
Female  0.454  0.498  0.442  0.497  -0.013  0.011 
Age  18.783  2.144  18.892  2.169  0.109*  0.050 
White  0.318  0.466  0.320  0.466  0.002  0.011 
Black  0.593  0.491  0.594  0.491  0.001  0.011 
Other race  0.089  0.285  0.086  0.281  -0.003  0.007 
Never married  0.924  0.262  0.926  0.259  0.002  0.006 
Married  0.018  0.132  0.015  0.122  -0.003  0.003 
Living together  0.037  0.187  0.036  0.183  -0.002  0.004 
Separated  0.020  0.140  0.023  0.149  0.003  0.003 
Has a child  0.189  0.386  0.187  0.386  -0.003  0.009 
# of children  0.276  0.648  0.273  0.650  -0.003  0.015 
Education  10.115  1.496  10.132  1.538  0.017  0.035 
Mother's ed.  11.761  1.914  11.744  1.958  -0.017  0.044 
Father's ed.  11.702  1.874  11.615  1.928  -0.088*  0.044 
Ever arrested  0.257  0.433  0.256  0.433  -0.001  0.010 
Household income:             
<3,000  0.247  0.346  0.251  0.345  0.003  0.008 
3,000 - 6,000  0.212  0.330  0.205  0.320  -0.007  0.007 
6,000 - 9,000  0.109  0.247  0.118  0.258  0.009  0.006 
9,000 - 18,000  0.246  0.348  0.243  0.342  -0.003  0.008 
>18,000  0.186  0.317  0.184  0.311  -0.003  0.007 
Personal income             
<3,000  0.788  0.393  0.788  0.392  0.000  0.009 
3,000 - 6,000  0.136  0.330  0.129  0.322  -0.007  0.007 
6,000 - 9,000  0.043  0.195  0.052  0.213  0.008  0.005 
>9,000  0.033  0.171  0.031  0.167  -0.001  0.004 
At baseline             
Have a job  0.188  0.386  0.203  0.398  0.015  0.009 
Months employed  6.024  3.026  6.033  3.060  0.009  0.070 
Had a job  0.627  0.479  0.641  0.476  0.014  0.011 
Earnings  2799.802  4221.407  2895.404  4202.122  95.602  96.814 
Usual hrs/week  34.773  12.010  35.376  12.088  0.602*  0.277 
Usual weekly earnings  106.572  114.224  111.672  121.653  5.100  2.711 
After random assignment             
Week 52 weekly hrs.  17.955  23.529  15.724  23.021  -2.231*  0.535 
Week 104 weekly hrs.  21.955  26.468  22.739  26.482  0.785  0.609 
Week 156 weekly hrs.  23.574  26.172  26.012  26.852  2.438*  0.609 
Week 208 weekly hrs.  25.529  26.294  28.003  25.959  2.473*  0.601 
Week 52 weekly earnings  104.211  162.416  94.053  151.607  -10.158*  3.613 
Week 104 weekly earnings  149.629  214.956  157.384  198.883  7.754  4.763 
Week 156 weekly earnings  176.821  222.243  204.239  241.547  27.418*  5.331 
Week 208 weekly earnings  194.657  224.183  229.703  251.732  35.046*  5.473 
Sample size  2978     4595          
Notes:  Same as in Table A1.1. 
!
!
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Table A1.3. Whites sample summary statistics, by treatment status, NJCS. 
Variable  Control  Program  Difference 
Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D.  Difference  S.E. 
Female  0.389  0.488  0.375  0.484  -0.014  0.020 
Age  18.860  2.186  18.889  2.132  0.029  0.089 
Never married  0.878  0.325  0.887  0.315  0.010  0.013 
Married  0.032  0.174  0.024  0.153  -0.007  0.007 
Living together  0.048  0.212  0.055  0.226  0.007  0.009 
Separated  0.043  0.201  0.033  0.179  -0.009  0.008 
Has a child  0.124  0.323  0.100  0.296  -0.024  0.013 
# of children  0.170  0.491  0.132  0.435  -0.038*  0.019 
Education  10.137  1.501  10.141  1.546  0.004  0.063 
Mother's ed.  11.780  1.897  11.818  1.933  0.037  0.079 
Father's ed.  11.863  1.983  11.699  2.094  -0.164  0.084 
Ever arrested  0.292  0.451  0.308  0.459  0.016  0.019 
Household income:             
<3,000  0.179  0.299  0.192  0.303  0.013  0.012 
3,000 - 6,000  0.173  0.305  0.177  0.300  0.004  0.012 
6,000 - 9,000  0.108  0.255  0.105  0.245  -0.002  0.010 
9,000 - 18,000  0.281  0.382  0.271  0.369  -0.010  0.015 
>18,000  0.260  0.385  0.256  0.376  -0.005  0.016 
Personal income             
<3,000  0.719  0.440  0.729  0.435  0.010  0.018 
3,000 - 6,000  0.183  0.380  0.157  0.356  -0.026  0.015 
6,000 - 9,000  0.059  0.231  0.071  0.253  0.012  0.010 
>9,000  0.039  0.188  0.042  0.197  0.004  0.008 
At baseline             
Have a job  0.241  0.423  0.265  0.438  0.024  0.018 
Months employed  6.395  3.372  6.410  3.298  0.015  0.137 
Had a job  0.736  0.436  0.749  0.431  0.013  0.018 
Earnings  3676.064  4951.978  3870.846  4879.621  194.782  202.509 
Usual hrs/week  34.632  13.355  36.228  14.280  1.596*  0.569 
Usual weekly earnings  124.317  113.573  139.239  138.750  14.922*  5.215 
After random assignment             
Week 52 weekly hrs.  22.764  24.598  20.812  25.274  -1.952  1.027 
Week 104 weekly hrs.  26.963  27.864  28.392  28.245  1.428  1.155 
Week 156 weekly hrs.  28.682  26.984  30.754  28.092  2.071  1.134 
Week 208 weekly hrs.  30.266  25.896  33.268  26.733  3.002*  1.084 
Week 52 weekly earnings  134.303  169.735  129.586  176.833  -4.717  7.137 
Week 104 weekly earnings  187.490  224.168  207.121  231.743  19.631*  9.389 
Week 156 weekly earnings  220.483  235.227  254.313  272.943  33.830*  10.484 
Week 208 weekly earnings  237.449  229.065  284.036  275.967  46.587*  10.432 
Sample size  927     1431          
Notes:  Same as in Table A1.1. 
!
!
!
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Table A1.4. Blacks sample summary statistics, by treatment status, NJCS. 
Variable  Control  Program  Difference 
Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D.  Difference  S.E. 
Female  0.489  0.500  0.483  0.500  -0.007  0.015 
Age  18.711  2.118  18.849  2.189  0.137*  0.064 
Never married  0.951  0.213  0.949  0.217  -0.002  0.006 
Married  0.010  0.098  0.010  0.099  0.000  0.003 
Living together  0.028  0.163  0.023  0.149  -0.005  0.005 
Separated  0.011  0.102  0.017  0.129  0.006  0.003 
Has a child  0.232  0.418  0.241  0.423  0.009  0.012 
# of children  0.345  0.726  0.358  0.739  0.013  0.022 
Education  10.103  1.477  10.136  1.505  0.033  0.044 
Mother's ed.  11.820  1.751  11.784  1.817  -0.036  0.053 
Father's ed.  11.629  1.680  11.601  1.730  -0.028  0.050 
Ever arrested  0.235  0.420  0.228  0.416  -0.007  0.012 
Household income:             
<3,000  0.285  0.363  0.282  0.361  -0.003  0.011 
3,000 - 6,000  0.239  0.345  0.222  0.331  -0.017  0.010 
6,000 - 9,000  0.111  0.244  0.122  0.262  0.012  0.007 
9,000 - 18,000  0.221  0.320  0.228  0.326  0.007  0.010 
>18,000  0.144  0.261  0.146  0.263  0.002  0.008 
Personal income             
<3,000  0.817  0.367  0.812  0.370  -0.005  0.011 
3,000 - 6,000  0.117  0.306  0.121  0.310  0.004  0.009 
6,000 - 9,000  0.034  0.171  0.040  0.185  0.006  0.005 
>9,000  0.031  0.166  0.027  0.152  -0.005  0.005 
At baseline             
Have a job  0.162  0.364  0.170  0.371  0.008  0.011 
Months employed  5.875  2.852  5.872  2.927  -0.003  0.086 
Had a job  0.581  0.489  0.588  0.488  0.007  0.014 
Earnings  2396.421  3667.782  2442.836  3769.590  46.415  110.065 
Usual hrs/week  34.765  11.298  34.821  10.623  0.056  0.325 
Usual weekly earnings  97.175  107.057  97.378  108.423  0.203  3.189 
After random assignment             
Week 52 weekly hrs.  15.405  22.471  13.325  21.338  -2.080*  0.649 
Week 104 weekly hrs.  19.240  24.913  20.196  25.150  0.956  0.741 
Week 156 weekly hrs.  20.834  24.907  23.612  25.838  2.778*  0.751 
Week 208 weekly hrs.  23.231  26.235  25.407  25.171  2.176*  0.761 
Week 52 weekly earnings  86.813  150.780  76.550  132.795  -10.263*  4.210 
Week 104 weekly earnings  129.126  208.696  132.660  173.294  3.534  5.686 
Week 156 weekly earnings  152.496  208.031  176.965  217.239  24.469*  6.294 
Week 208 weekly earnings  173.397  218.869  201.068  231.578  27.671*  6.667 
Sample size  1794     2772          
Notes:  Same as in Table A1.1. 
!
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Table A1.5. Non-Hispanic Males sample summary statistics, by treatment status, NJCS. 
Variable  Control  Program  Difference 
Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D.  Difference  S.E. 
Age  18.670  2.066  18.767  2.145  0.097  0.064 
White  0.356  0.479  0.358  0.479  0.002  0.015 
Black  0.554  0.497  0.550  0.498  -0.004  0.015 
Other race  0.090  0.286  0.092  0.289  0.002  0.009 
Never married  0.946  0.223  0.947  0.222  0.001  0.007 
Married  0.010  0.097  0.011  0.101  0.001  0.003 
Living together  0.033  0.176  0.027  0.161  -0.006  0.005 
Separated  0.011  0.104  0.016  0.122  0.004  0.003 
Has a child  0.093  0.283  0.095  0.288  0.003  0.009 
# of children  0.121  0.408  0.125  0.416  0.004  0.013 
Education  10.009  1.429  10.004  1.524  -0.005  0.045 
Mother's ed.  11.808  1.833  11.796  1.937  -0.012  0.058 
Father's ed.  11.734  1.892  11.629  1.971  -0.105  0.059 
Ever arrested  0.321  0.463  0.321  0.463  0.000  0.014 
Household income:             
<3,000  0.225  0.328  0.225  0.319  -0.001  0.010 
3,000 - 6,000  0.201  0.319  0.192  0.303  -0.009  0.010 
6,000 - 9,000  0.107  0.244  0.114  0.249  0.007  0.008 
9,000 - 18,000  0.263  0.359  0.260  0.350  -0.002  0.011 
>18,000  0.204  0.332  0.209  0.331  0.005  0.010 
Personal income             
<3,000  0.786  0.393  0.783  0.395  -0.003  0.012 
3,000 - 6,000  0.133  0.326  0.124  0.316  -0.008  0.010 
6,000 - 9,000  0.047  0.203  0.056  0.220  0.008  0.006 
>9,000  0.034  0.174  0.037  0.182  0.003  0.005 
At baseline             
Have a job  0.180  0.379  0.211  0.404  0.031*  0.012 
Months employed  6.040  3.003  6.053  3.073  0.013  0.093 
Had a job  0.632  0.478  0.654  0.471  0.022  0.015 
Earnings  3002.686  4384.264  3172.903  4449.987  170.217  135.035 
Usual hrs/week  35.652  12.285  36.260  12.587  0.609  0.380 
Usual weekly earnings  115.328  121.083  123.087  130.419  7.759*  3.846 
After random assignment             
Week 52 weekly hrs.  19.322  24.694  17.179  24.006  -2.143*  0.745 
Week 104 weekly hrs.  23.953  27.723  25.381  28.219  1.428  0.855 
Week 156 weekly hrs.  26.087  27.791  28.265  27.829  2.178*  0.850 
Week 208 weekly hrs.  28.525  28.215  30.232  27.304  1.706*  0.849 
Week 52 weekly earnings  119.890  189.953  106.517  165.697  -13.373*  5.451 
Week 104 weekly earnings  166.555  211.962  182.464  219.703  15.909*  6.599 
Week 156 weekly earnings  198.935  236.264  233.446  266.674  34.511*  7.699 
Week 208 weekly earnings  223.342  238.795  257.811  276.422  34.469*  7.893 
Sample size  1805     2475          
Notes:  Same as in Table A1.1. 
!
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Table A1.6. Non-Hispanics Females sample summary statistics, by treatment status, NJCS. 
Variable  Control  Program  Difference 
Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D.  Difference  S.E. 
Age  18.919  2.228  19.050  2.189  0.131  0.077 
White  0.272  0.445  0.272  0.445  -0.001  0.016 
Black  0.638  0.481  0.649  0.477  0.011  0.017 
Other race  0.089  0.285  0.079  0.270  -0.010  0.010 
Never married  0.898  0.300  0.900  0.298  0.002  0.010 
Married  0.028  0.165  0.022  0.144  -0.007  0.005 
Living together  0.042  0.200  0.046  0.208  0.003  0.007 
Separated  0.031  0.173  0.033  0.177  0.001  0.006 
Has a child  0.306  0.456  0.302  0.456  -0.003  0.016 
# of children  0.461  0.813  0.459  0.823  -0.003  0.029 
Education  10.243  1.565  10.294  1.541  0.051  0.054 
Mother's ed.  11.705  2.005  11.679  1.981  -0.027  0.070 
Father's ed.  11.664  1.851  11.596  1.874  -0.068  0.065 
Ever arrested  0.180  0.379  0.173  0.375  -0.007  0.013 
Household income:             
<3,000  0.274  0.365  0.283  0.372  0.010  0.013 
3,000 - 6,000  0.225  0.342  0.221  0.340  -0.004  0.012 
6,000 - 9,000  0.110  0.250  0.123  0.269  0.012  0.009 
9,000 - 18,000  0.226  0.333  0.222  0.331  -0.004  0.012 
>18,000  0.165  0.295  0.151  0.280  -0.014  0.010 
Personal income             
<3,000  0.790  0.393  0.793  0.389  0.004  0.014 
3,000 - 6,000  0.140  0.336  0.135  0.329  -0.005  0.012 
6,000 - 9,000  0.039  0.185  0.047  0.203  0.008  0.007 
>9,000  0.031  0.167  0.024  0.146  -0.007  0.005 
At baseline             
Have a job  0.197  0.394  0.193  0.391  -0.004  0.014 
Months employed  6.005  3.054  6.008  3.044  0.003  0.106 
Had a job  0.621  0.481  0.625  0.481  0.004  0.017 
Earnings  2556.145  4005.201  2544.794  3838.801  -11.351  136.874 
Usual hrs/week  33.719  11.589  34.258  11.331  0.540  0.400 
Usual weekly earnings  96.056  104.479  97.249  107.897  1.193  3.701 
After random assignment             
Week 52 weekly hrs.  16.314  21.944  13.886  21.580  -2.428*  0.759 
Week 104 weekly hrs.  19.555  24.674  19.402  23.698  -0.153  0.844 
Week 156 weekly hrs.  20.556  23.746  23.164  25.285  2.608*  0.854 
Week 208 weekly hrs.  21.931  23.288  25.186  23.864  3.255*  0.822 
Week 52 weekly earnings  85.382  118.711  78.306  130.009  -7.075  4.335 
Week 104 weekly earnings  129.302  216.840  125.696  163.592  -3.607  6.726 
Week 156 weekly earnings  150.263  201.030  167.337  199.492  17.075*  6.984 
Week 208 weekly earnings  160.208  199.982  194.189  211.335  33.981*  7.168 
Sample size  1173     2120          
Notes:  Same as in Table A1.1. 
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Assumption  A and B  A, B and C  A  A and C 
Effect         
Upper bound  0.099  0.099  0.464  0.464 
  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.021)  (0.021) 
Lower bound  -0.022  0.037  -0.430  -0.371 
  (0.016)  (0.012)  (0.025)  (0.021) 
Width   0.121  0.062  0.894  0.835 
95 percent IM 
Confidence interval  [-0.049, 0.122]  [0.018, 0.122]  [-0.471, 0.498]  [-0.406, 0.498] 
Note: Effects are on untransformed wages. 
 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Strata  All 
Non-
Hispanic  Whites  Blacks 
NH 
Male 
NH 
Female  Hispanic 
EE  0.566  0.559  0.657  0.512  0.583  0.53  0.598 
t-statistic  66.07  58.79  40.69  41.79  50.42  34.7  29.49 
NN  0.393  0.392  0.303  0.436  0.377  0.41  0.399 
t-statistic  59.67  54.1  24.41  45.49  38.17  37.98  24.58 
NE  0.041  0.049  0.04  0.052  0.04  0.06  0.002 
t-statistic  3.82  4.15  1.99  3.35  2.61  3.23  0.080 
Sample size  9145  7573  2358  4566  4280  3293  1572 
"#$%&!"'!($)*+(!,#-!"#*.'/(0)*/12!
Table A2. Bounds on the average treatment eﬀect
of the EE strata for ln(wage) in week 208, with and
without Assumption B.
Table A3. Estimated principal strata proportions by
demographic groups! 10 
 
 
 
 
Table A4.1. All sample average labor market pre-treatment covariates by strata, 
and difference across strata to indirectly test Assumption C.!
! "#$%#%! &'(()$)*+)!%+$,--!
.%$'%/0)! 11! 22! 12! 22!3-4!11! 22!3-4!12!
2%$*'*5-! 677849:;! <<77476;! <8;=4<8:! 6=9<4>76! ?:;=4==@!
! ! ! ! A6:7499=B! A6:7@49:@B!
C%D!%!E,/!! 94;<8! 94@96! 94;@>! 9468;! 946:<!
! ! ! ! A9496;B! A946:6B!
F,*#G-!)HI0,J)D!! ;4;>:! 84<99! 84=68! 94@6>! ?9466;!
! ! ! ! A9497=B! A94@88B!
2DK+%#',*! 74>=8! 694:@@! 694<:<! 94=<6! ?949=8!
! ! ! ! A949=7B! A94<>8B!
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors for the difference across strata are in parenthesis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A4.2. Non-Hispanics sample average labor market pre-treatment covariates 
by strata, and difference across strata to indirectly test Assumption C. 
  Strata  Difference across 
Variable  NN  EE  NE  EE vs. NN  EE vs. NE 
Earnings  2041.192  3385.669  3142.984  1344.477  242.685 
        (141.561)  (946.552) 
Had a job   0.543  0.702  0.587  0.159  0.115 
        (0.016)  (0.112) 
Months employed   5.602  6.318  6.142  0.716  0.175 
        (0.104)  (0.704) 
Education  9.869  10.289  10.266  0.421  0.024 
        (0.052)  (0.347) 
Notes: Same as in Table A4.1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tables A4. Gauging monotonicity across strata, As-
sumption C. Indirect evidence by demographic groups! 11 
 
 
 
 
Table A4.3. Whites sample average labor market pre-treatment covariates by 
strata, and difference across strata to indirectly test Assumption C. 
  Strata  Difference across 
Variable  NN  EE  NE  EE vs. NN  EE vs. NE 
Earnings  3174.900  4220.867  946.539  1045.967  3274.328 
        (318.134)  (2470.000) 
Had a job   0.697  0.783  0.423  0.086  0.360 
        (0.028)  (0.223) 
Months employed   5.907  6.698  5.307  0.792  1.391 
        (0.211)  (1.691) 
Education  9.916  10.242  10.128  0.326  0.114 
        (0.095)  (0.779) 
Notes: Same as in Table A4.1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A4.4. Blacks sample average labor market pre-treatment covariates by strata, 
and difference across strata to indirectly test Assumption C. 
  Strata  Difference across 
Variable  NN  EE  NE  EE vs. NN  EE vs. NE 
Earnings  1605.477  2932.503  4198.609  1327.026  -1266.106 
        (159.152)  (1032.246) 
Had a job   0.482  0.658  0.727  0.175  -0.069 
        (0.022)  (0.139) 
Months employed   5.493  6.129  6.553  0.636  -0.424 
        (0.126)  (0.805) 
Education  9.850  10.318  10.432  0.468  -0.114 
        (0.065)  (0.421) 
Notes: Same as in Table A4.1.  
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Table A4.5. Non-Hispanic Males sample average labor market pre-treatment 
covariates by strata, and difference across strata to indirectly test Assumption C. 
  Strata  Difference across 
Variable  NN  EE  NE  EE vs. NN  EE vs. NE 
Earnings  2223.791  3618.566  3496.857  1394.775  121.709 
        (188.053)  (1614.536) 
Had a job   0.544  0.707  0.643  0.163  0.064 
        (0.022)  (0.178) 
Months employed   5.704  6.322  5.263  0.617  1.058 
        (0.135)  (1.107) 
Education  9.744  10.162  10.218  0.418  -0.056 
        (0.067)  (0.542) 
Notes: Same as in Table A4.1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A4.6. Non-Hispanic Females sample average labor market pre-treatment 
covariates by strata, and difference across strata to indirectly test Assumption C. 
  Strata  Difference across 
Variable  NN  EE  NE  EE vs. NN  EE vs. NE 
Earnings  1828.909  3077.960  2828.645  1249.051  249.314 
        (211.355)  (1127.382) 
Had a job   0.542  0.694  0.539  0.152  0.156 
        (0.025)  (0.141) 
Months employed   5.483  6.313  6.881  0.829  -0.568 
        (0.164)  (0.880) 
Education  10.014  10.458  10.320  0.444  0.138 
        (0.080)  (0.459) 
Notes: Same as in Table A4.1.  
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Table A5.1 Bounds on the quantile treatment effect of the EE strata for untransformed 
ln(wage) in week 208, by demographic groups, using assumptions A and B.!
!-
percent
ile 
All  Non-Hispanics  Whites  Blacks  NH Males  NH Females 
LB  UB  LB  UB  LB  UB  LB  UB  LB  UB  LB  UB 
0.05  0.068  0.161  0.105  0.201  -0.02  0.155  0.133  0.218  0.105  0.201  -0.01  0.210 
0.10  0.011  0.102  0.011  0.102  0.009  0.091  0.011  0.110  0.035  0.134  0.000  0.093 
0.15  0.001  0.087  0.000  0.087  0.009  0.051  0.028  0.115  0.022  0.084  0.000  0.106 
0.20  0.043  0.071  0.034  0.083  0.000  0.041  0.018  0.085  0.000  0.080  0.010  0.087 
0.25  0.000  0.080  0.000  0.080  0.019  0.065  0.000  0.065  0.033  0.087  -0.03  0.033 
0.30  0.000  0.067  0.008  0.085  0.000  0.056  0.025  0.080  0.000  0.074  0.000  0.067 
0.35  0.000  0.074  0.000  0.074  0.009  0.046  0.024  0.113  0.029  0.036  -0.00  0.071 
0.40  0.030  0.065  0.009  0.074  0.000  0.057  0.000  0.074  0.000  0.069  -0.01  0.095 
0.45  0.000  0.069  0.000  0.069  0.035  0.070  0.036  0.096  0.056  0.102  0.000  0.109 
0.50  0.030  0.081  0.039  0.117  0.034  0.098  0.000  0.078  0.000  0.065  0.020  0.089 
0.55  0.005  0.065  0.000  0.065  0.065  0.095  0.023  0.098  0.032  0.063  0.021  0.121 
0.60  0.018  0.048  0.032  0.073  0.028  0.061  0.009  0.065  0.000  0.061  0.028  0.093 
0.65  0.012  0.062  0.000  0.066  0.061  0.118  0.013  0.055  0.031  0.088  0.039  0.098 
0.70  0.000  0.057  0.021  0.078  0.033  0.111  0.000  0.075  0.008  0.090  0.000  0.069 
0.75  -0.02  0.054  -0.01  0.084  0.028  0.105  -0.02  0.074  0.027  0.105  -0.00  0.085 
0.80  -0.03  0.051  -0.01  0.078  -0.02  0.034  -0.04  0.080  -0.01  0.035  -0.03  0.090 
0.85  -0.00  0.067  -0.03  0.065  0.001  0.140  -0.04  0.051  0.00  0.095  -0.03  0.078 
0.90  -0.11  0.046  -0.09  0.087  -0.03  0.129  -0.07  0.054  -0.07  0.085  -0.07  0.078 
0.95  -0.20  0.061  -0.18  0.105  -0.10  0.139  -0.23  0.033  -0.15  0.115  -0.18  0.080 
"#$%&!"'!($)*+(!,#-!"#*.'/(0)*/12!34!)*+!54!($)*+!,#-!600%-!)*+!7#8%-!9#6*+:!-%(0%1$/;%7<=!
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Tables A5. Bounds and conﬁdence intervals on QTEEE
by demographic groups, using Assumptions A and B! 14 
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Table A5.2 95 percent Imbens and Manski (2004) confidence interval for Bounds on Table 
A5.1. 
  !-             All    Non-Hispanics          Whites           Blacks        NH Males     NH Females 
 percen-  
 tile              LB       UB       LB       UB        LB       UB       LB       UB       LB       UB       LB       UB   
0.05  -0.034  0.251  -0.005  0.29  -0.224  0.318  0.019  0.338  0.010  0.306  -0.255  0.398 
0.10  -0.008  0.142  -0.008  0.144  -0.033  0.153  -0.007  0.157  0.005  0.178  -0.011  0.142 
0.15  -0.020  0.104  -0.021  0.107  -0.039  0.101  -0.004  0.152  -0.021  0.132  -0.033  0.152 
0.20  0.010  0.107  -0.001  0.119  -0.022  0.088  -0.019  0.129  -0.021  0.114  -0.027  0.122 
0.25  -0.012  0.104  -0.007  0.101  -0.021  0.111  -0.025  0.106  -0.005  0.134  -0.080  0.082 
0.30  -0.021  0.102  -0.017  0.128  -0.037  0.108  -0.007  0.119  -0.027  0.106  -0.009  0.103 
0.35  -0.014  0.086  -0.018  0.093  -0.045  0.091  -0.010  0.152  -0.011  0.080  -0.043  0.124 
0.40  -0.002  0.101  -0.030  0.115  -0.021  0.1  -0.031  0.105  -0.014  0.094  -0.050  0.137 
0.45  -0.014  0.079  -0.011  0.084  -0.010  0.113  -0.002  0.136  0.017  0.143  -0.043  0.153 
0.50  -0.001  0.118  0.004  0.151  -0.013  0.139  -0.027  0.110  -0.035  0.090  -0.027  0.132 
0.55  -0.022  0.075  -0.028  0.086  0.021  0.139  -0.015  0.130  -0.009  0.108  -0.022  0.161 
0.60  -0.009  0.079  -0.001  0.106  -0.018  0.095  -0.030  0.091  -0.027  0.076  -0.013  0.123 
0.65  -0.015  0.083  -0.020  0.086  0.018  0.161  -0.022  0.090  -0.007  0.128  -0.013  0.140 
0.70  -0.020  0.073  -0.014  0.109  -0.022  0.163  -0.029  0.109  -0.042  0.137  -0.032  0.102 
0.75  -0.054  0.074  -0.055  0.118  -0.036  0.153  -0.058  0.114  -0.024  0.132  -0.054  0.132 
0.80  -0.074  0.081  -0.057  0.104  -0.069  0.092  -0.090  0.111  -0.060  0.081  -0.081  0.131 
0.85  -0.040  0.101  -0.062  0.094  -0.078  0.216  -0.110  0.096  -0.050  0.141  -0.096  0.124 
0.90  -0.177  0.095  -0.145  0.127  -0.153  0.216  -0.130  0.104  -0.152  0.155  -0.139  0.133 
0.95  -0.284  0.120  -0.253  0.170  -0.275  0.246  -0.312  0.101  -0.289  0.203  -0.288  0.163 
"#$%&!>)?%!)(!/*!@)97%!AB=C=!
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Table A6.1.!All sample. Differences in mean labor market pre-treatment covariates 
across the EE and NE strata (EE-NE), within quintile of the corresponding covariate. 
This is an indirect test of Assumption D. 
Variable  Quintile 1  Quintile 2  Quintile 3  Quintile 4  Quintile 5 
Earnings  0.00  -38.06  541.57  -261.28  -34.27 
 
(0.00)  (119.70)  (739.12)  (370.22)  (3510.70) 
Had a job   0.00  -0.32  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 
(0.00)  (0.22)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (000) 
Months employed   -0.32  1.98  0.00  -0.15  0.76 
 
(0.41)  (1.24)  (0.00)  (0.18)  (0.89) 
Education  0.83  -0.01  -0.11*  0.40  -0.06 
 
(0.90)  (0.17)  (0.05)  (0.42)  (0.21) 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors for the difference across strata are in parenthesis.  
   See footnote 20 in the paper for details on test implementation. 
 
 
!
!
!
!
Table A6.2.!Non-Hispanics sample. Differences in mean labor market pre-treatment 
covariates across the EE and NE strata (EE-NE), within quintile of the corresponding 
covariate. This is an indirect test of Assumption D. 
Variable  Quintile 1  Quintile 2  Quintile 3  Quintile 4  Quintile 5 
Earnings  0.00  16.48  524.4  -222.36  2323 
 
(0.00)  (36.89)  (606.3)  (399.19)  (2018) 
Had a job   0.00  0.19  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 
(0.00)  (0.16)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Months employed   -0.24  0.98  0.00  -0.07  0.30 
 
(0.29)  (1.10)  (0.00)  (0.12)  (1.25) 
Education  0.45  0.02  0.02  0.04  1.66 
 
(0.54)  (0.21)  (0.03)  (0.30)  (1.16) 
Notes: Same as in Table A6.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tables A6. Gauging stochastic dominance, Assump-
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Table A6.3.!Whites sample. Differences in mean labor market pre-treatment covariates 
across the EE and NE strata (EE-NE), within quintile of the corresponding covariate. 
This is an indirect test of Assumption D. 
Variable  Quintile 1  Quintile 2  Quintile 3  Quintile 4  Quintile 5 
Earnings  0.00  72.77  -46.38  168.53  -22199 
 
(0.00)  (78.58)  (2182)  (373.18)  (23904) 
Had a job   0.00  0.41*  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 
(0.00)  (0.16)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Months employed   -2.08  -1.08  0.00  0.00  15.16 
 
(1.02)  (1.97)  (0.00)  (0.22)  (12.54) 
Education  -0.35  -1.21  0.06  -0.36  -0.27 
 
(0.51)  (2.17)  (0.04)  (1.42)  (0.54) 
Notes: Same as in Table A6.1. 
!
!
!
!
!
!
Table A6.4.!Blacks sample. Differences in mean labor market pre-treatment covariates 
across the EE and NE strata (EE-NE), within quintile of the corresponding covariate. 
This is an indirect test of Assumption D. 
Variable  Quintile 1  Quintile 2  Quintile 3  Quintile 4  Quintile 5 
Earnings  0.00  450.1  -130.9  -1268.51  723.9 
 
(0.00)  (511.9)  (283.6)  (829.05)  (1294) 
Had a job   0.00  -0.08  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 
(0.00)  (0.24)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Months employed   0.21   -6.56*  0.00  -0.44  -1.09 
 
(0.28)  (3.12)  (0.00)  (0.32)  (0.91) 
Education  0.89  0.17  0.19  0.26  0.16 
 
(0.71)  (0.16)  (0.67)  (0.27)  (0.13) 
Notes: Same as in Table A6.1. 
!
!
!
!
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Table A6.5.!Non-Hispanics Males sample. Differences in mean labor market pre-
treatment covariates across the EE and NE strata (EE-NE), within quintile of the 
corresponding covariate. This is an indirect test of Assumption D. 
Variable  Quintile 1  Quintile 2  Quintile 3  Quintile 4  Quintile 5 
Earnings  0.00  -89.64  201.8  -414.97  2455 
 
(0.00)  (91.71)  (850.7)  (782.10)  (3481) 
Had a job   0.00  0.29  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 
(0.00)  (0.68)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Months employed   -0.38  -2.69  0.00  -0.29  17.37 
 
(0.43)  (2.26)  (0.00)  (0.21)  (58.05) 
Education  -0.39  0.30*  -0.06  0.45  0.83* 
 
(0.76)  (0.13)  (0.11)  (0.34)  (0.35) 
Notes: Same as in Table A6.1. 
!
!
!
!
!
!
Table A6.6.!Non-Hispanics Females sample. Differences in mean labor market pre-
treatment covariates across the EE and NE strata (EE-NE), within quintile of the 
corresponding covariate. This is an indirect test of Assumption D. 
Variable  Quintile 1  Quintile 2  Quintile 3  Quintile 4  Quintile 5 
Earnings  0.00  61.22  423.2  -151.37  2074 
 
(0.00)  (66.04)  (810.4)  (510.31)  (2429) 
Had a job   0.00  0.04  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 
(0.00)  (0.16)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Months employed   0.03  4.53  0.00  0.23  0.35 
 
(0.46)  (2.03)  (0.00)  (0.17)  (0.89) 
Education  0.38  -0.04  0.04  -0.03  -0.17 
 
(0.43)  (0.31)  (0.05)  (0.61)  (0.17) 
Notes: Same as in Table A6.1. 
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Table A7.1 Bounds on the quantile treatment effect of the EE strata for untransformed 
ln(wage) in week 208, by demographic groups, using assumptions A, B and D.!
!-
percent
ile 
All  Non-Hispanics  Whites  Blacks  NH Males  NH Females 
LB  UB  LB  UB  LB  UB  LB  UB  LB  UB  LB  UB 
0.05  0.084  0.161  0.105  0.201  0.027  0.155  0.153  0.218  0.116  0.201  0.065  0.210 
0.10  0.011  0.102  0.011  0.102  0.019  0.091  0.019  0.110  0.047  0.134  0.000  0.093 
0.15  0.027  0.087  0.027  0.087  0.009  0.051  0.038  0.115  0.060  0.084  0.019  0.106 
0.20  0.043  0.071  0.043  0.083  0.000  0.041  0.058  0.085  0.012  0.080  0.044  0.087 
0.25  0.025  0.080  0.020  0.080  0.026  0.065  0.000  0.065  0.064  0.087  0.000  0.033 
0.30  0.039  0.067  0.044  0.085  0.000  0.056  0.041  0.080  0.025  0.074  0.000  0.067 
0.35  0.035  0.074  0.023  0.074  0.041  0.046  0.039  0.113  0.036  0.036  0.016  0.071 
0.40  0.036  0.065  0.039  0.074  0.000  0.057  0.063  0.074  0.026  0.069  0.021  0.095 
0.45  0.035  0.069  0.035  0.069  0.069  0.070  0.036  0.096  0.069  0.102  0.074  0.109 
0.50  0.042  0.081  0.065  0.117  0.080  0.098  0.058  0.078  0.054  0.065  0.050  0.089 
0.55  0.065  0.065  0.065  0.065  0.065  0.095  0.053  0.098  0.032  0.063  0.069  0.121 
0.60  0.022  0.048  0.038  0.073  0.061  0.061  0.065  0.065  0.058  0.061  0.090  0.093 
0.65  0.061  0.062  0.061  0.066  0.090  0.118  0.031  0.055  0.053  0.088  0.072  0.098 
0.70  0.035  0.057  0.054  0.078  0.083  0.111  0.061  0.075  0.055  0.090  0.061  0.069 
0.75  0.038  0.054  0.066  0.084  0.080  0.105  0.054  0.074  0.089  0.105  0.056  0.085 
0.80  0.051  0.051  0.078  0.078  0.000  0.034  0.054  0.080  0.010  0.035  0.069  0.090 
0.85  0.049  0.067  0.049  0.065  0.104  0.140  0.051  0.051  0.095  0.095  0.078  0.078 
0.90  0.030  0.046  0.071  0.087  0.109  0.129  0.049  0.054  0.075  0.085  0.065  0.078 
0.95  0.031  0.061  0.074  0.105  0.124  0.139  0.021  0.033  0.076  0.115  0.052  0.080 
"#$%&!"'!($)*+(!,#-!"#*.'/(0)*/12!34!)*+!54!($)*+!,#-!600%-!)*+!7#8%-!9#6*+:!-%(0%1$/;%7<=!
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Table A7.2 95 percent Imbens and Manski (2004) confidence interval for Bounds on Table 
A7.1. 
  !-             All    Non-Hispanics          Whites            Blacks          NH Males        NH Females 
 percen-  
 tile           LB         UB      LB         UB         LB        UB         LB         UB          LB        UB         LB        UB   
0.05  -0.004  0.251  0.016  0.29  -0.164  0.318  0.041  0.338  0.027  0.306  -0.16  0.398 
0.10  -0.009  0.142  -0.008  0.144  -0.022  0.153  -0.001  0.157  0.023  0.178  -0.02  0.142 
0.15  0.005  0.104  0.000  0.107  -0.037  0.101  0.000  0.152  0.020  0.132  -0.01  0.152 
0.20  0.019  0.107  0.019  0.119  -0.021  0.088  0.021  0.129  -0.02  0.114  0.012  0.122 
0.25  0.005  0.104  -0.002  0.101  -0.013  0.111  -0.027  0.106  0.031  0.134  -0.04  0.082 
0.30  0.019  0.102  0.015  0.128  -0.037  0.108  0.019  0.119  -0.01  0.106  -0.02  0.103 
0.35  0.013  0.086  -0.007  0.093  -0.004  0.091  0.016  0.152  0.007  0.080  -0.02  0.124 
0.40  0.014  0.101  0.015  0.115  -0.028  0.1  0.031  0.105  -0.00  0.094  -0.01  0.137 
0.45  0.018  0.079  0.012  0.084  0.045  0.113  0.004  0.136  0.047  0.143  0.042  0.153 
0.50  0.02  0.118  0.041  0.151  0.028  0.139  0.035  0.11  0.018  0.090  0.007  0.132 
0.55  0.049  0.075  0.041  0.086  0.029  0.139  0.018  0.13  -0.00  0.108  0.041  0.161 
0.60  -0.006  0.079  0.008  0.106  0.029  0.095  0.043  0.091  0.038  0.076  0.057  0.123 
0.65  0.046  0.083  0.051  0.086  0.047  0.161  0.000  0.09  0.013  0.128  0.036  0.140 
0.70  0.011  0.073  0.02  0.109  0.032  0.163  0.037  0.109  0.008  0.137  0.032  0.102 
0.75  0.014  0.074  0.03  0.118  0.028  0.153  0.020  0.114  0.054  0.132  0.010  0.132 
0.80  0.020  0.081  0.049  0.104  -0.047  0.092  0.026  0.111  -0.03  0.081  0.026  0.131 
0.85  0.019  0.101  0.025  0.094  0.033  0.216  0.013  0.096  0.053  0.141  0.033  0.124 
0.90  -0.024  0.095  0.022  0.127  0.031  0.216  -0.001  0.104  0.010  0.155  0.011  0.133 
0.95  -0.026  0.120  0.009  0.17  0.019  0.246  -0.047  0.101  -0.01  0.203  -0.03  0.163 
"#$%&!>)?%!)(!/*!@)97%!AD=C=!
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